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Men and women often do different jobs: most carpenters, phy-
sicians, and police officers are male; most secretaries, nurses, 
and telephone operators are female. Despite substantial progress 
in the desegregation of the workplace2 vocational choices and vo-
cational opportunities are still very much affected by factors 
linked to sex and race. 3 In the economic marketplace, most 
traditional "women's" jobs pay less than "men's" jobs. 
In a'recent issue of this Journal, Professor Ruth G. Blumrosen 
has argued that the wage marketplace is infected with sex and 
race discrimination.' The type of discrimination that she alleges 
is the same as that addressed by the "equal worth" or "compara-
* B.B.A., 1965; J.D., 1968, University of Michigan . 
. ** B.A., 1957, Yale University; Ph.D., 1964, Duke University; J.D., 1977, University of 
California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall). 
*** B.A., 1972, Stanford University; M.A., 1976, University of California, Davis; J.D., 
1976, Stanford University. 
The authors are affiliated with the law firm of Morrison & Foerster, San Francisco, 
California. 
' This article responds to,Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J. L. REr. 397 (1979). 
• Between 1950 and 1976, the proportion of female lawyers and judges rose from 4.1% 
to 9.2%, an increase of 124%. The corresponding increases for some other occupations 
were: accountants, 81%; engineers, 50%; physicians and osteopaths, 97%; college and uni-
versity teachers and presidents, 37%; bank officials and financial managers, 111%; buyers 
and purchasing agents, 152%. U.S. BUREAU or LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, U.S. 
WORKING WOMEN: A DATABOOK 9, Table 8 (1977) [hereinafter cited as WORKING WOMEN). 
See also note 255 infra; H. NORTHRUP & J. LARSON, THE IMPACT OF THE AT&T-EEO CON-
SENT DECREE (1979) (extensive progress in desegregating jobs in telephone industry under 
consent decree); Hedges & Bemis, Sex Stereotyping: Its Decline in Skilled Trades, 
MONTHLY LAB. REv., May 1974, at 14-22. But see WORKING WOMEN, supra, at 34-35, Ta-
bles 35-37 (women's earnings substantially lower than men's in all fields; little change 
· during years 1955-1976). 
' See Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 400 n.3. 
' See note 1 supra. Note the distinction between Wage Discrimination, a short form of 
citation to Professor Blumrosen's article, and "wage discrimination," that article's cen-
tral concept. 
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ble worth" movement.5 Professor Blumrosen prescribes a judicial 
remedy: the courts should appraise the worth of jobs and should 
compel employers to pay wages proportional to such "worth." 
The issue is not merely academic. Professor Blumrosen is a 
prominent consultant to the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC). Her thesis will no doubt strike a sympa-
thetic chord with the Chair of that agency, Eleanor Holmes Nor-
ton, who foresees the "equal worth" question as ''the women's 
issue of the 1980's."8 It is, in Norton's view, "the same kind of 
outsized issue [as] school desegregation" and the "most difficult 
issue to arise under Title Vll."7 
The EEOC and other plaintiffs have litigated "comparabie 
worth" several times, and although the theory has lost consist.-
ently,8 the EEOC has not given up. It continues to maintain that 
"comparable worth" is the law, even though the courts do not 
agree.9 The agency has commissioned a major study by the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences (NAS) on the feasibility of a bias-
free job evaluation system, the development of which would be 
prerequisite to large-scale enforcement of the "comparable 
worth" theory. 10 The EEOC's counterpart in the Department of 
• Professor Blumrosen's wage discrimination theory addresses the same discrimination 
issues as the slogans "equal pay for jobs of equal worth" and "equal pay for jobs of 
comparable worth." See, e.g., Lewin, The "Pink Collar" Revolution, NAT. L.J., Dec. 10, 
1979, at 1, col. 1; Crystal, Comparable Worth?, Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1979, at 24, col. 3; 
Address by Alexis Herman, Director, Women's Bureau, Dep't of Labor, at Organizing 
Conference of Coalition of Labor Union Women (Washington, Jan. 24, 1980), reprinted in 
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNAi, No. 17, at E-1 (Jan. 24, 1980). Courts rejecting the equal worth 
or comparable worth approach to wage discrimination under Title VII include: Christen-
sen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977); IUE v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 19 Fair 
Empl. Prac. Cas. 450 (D.N.J. 1979), appeal pending, Nos. 79-1893 and 79-1894 (3d Cir.); 
Lemons v. City & County of Denver, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 81, at D-1 (10th Cir. 
April 24, 1980). The slogans, however, greatly understate the proponents' demands. 
"Equal worth" proponents are asking not only for equal pay for jobs equal in "worth," btit 
also for wage increases for "female" jobs that, they admit, are worth less than the compari-
son "male" jobs, but which, they assert, are "worth" a greater proportion of the "male" 
jobs' wage than they are paid. See, e.g., Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 400 
& 490-501, especially the hypothetical example at 496-97. This article will use the term 
"comparable worth theory" to refer to the comparable worth idea as well as its synonym, 
the equal worth idea. However, "proportionate worth theory" would be a more accurate 
label. 
• DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 211, at A-2 (Oct. 30, 1979) (paraphrase of Chair Norton's 
remarks at Conference on Pay Equity, Washington, D.C., October 23, 1979)_-
1 Id. 
• See cases cited in notes 4 supra and 206 & 212 and accompanying text infra. 
• See, e.g., Address by EEOC Commissioner J. Clay Smith, Biennial Conference on 
Civil Rights of Ohio AFL-CIO (Feb. 6, 1980), reprinted in DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 28, 
at E-2 (Feb. 8, 1980). See also Remarks of Daniel G. Leach, Vice Chair of the EEOC, to 
the Federal Bar Association (Washington, D.C., June 9, 1978), excerpted in EMPL. PRAC. 
GumE (CCH) 1 5070 (July 6, 1978). 
,. NATIONAL RESEARCH CouNCn/NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, JOB EVALUATION: AN 
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Labor, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs 
(OFCCP), has included "comparable worth" in its recent Fed-
eral Contract Compliance Manual. 11 Thus, in the view of the fed-
eral government's equal employment opportunity agencies, pro-
portionate pay for jobs of proportionate worth is an idea whose 
time is coming, if it has not already arrived. 12 
The EEOC's commissioning of the NAS study is an attempt to 
provide a scientific foundation for "comparable worth." 13 Profes-
sor Blumrosen's article is a parallel effort to construct a legal 
foundation for court appraisal of "worth." Her article argues 
forcefully that, when jobs are substantially segregated by sex or 
race, Title VII should be construed to require pay in proportion 
to the "worth" of jobs. 
We will endeavor to show that Professor Blumrosen's article is 
selective and oversimplified in its "historical, anthropological, 
sociological and economic"14 analysis. As a result, she has been 
misled to the conclusion that courts should in effect take judicial 
notice of "wage discrimination," which is a novel and controver-
sial concept. Her article assumes, incorrectly, that wage discrim-
ination is a proven and measurable statistic. The present article 
considers the legal argument that wage discrimination is prohib-
ANALYTIC REVIEW (Interim Report to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) 
(1979) [hereinafter cited as NAS REPORT). The reasons why. a bias-free job evaluation 
system would be necessary are analyzed in part Il B infra. 
II OFFICE OF FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE 
MANUAL § 2-250.2c (1979). The OFCCP also uses the term "wage discrimination," but 
not in the context of comparable worth theory. As the OFCCP defines wage discrimina-
tion, it is a concept different from anything discussed in Professor Blumrosen's article or 
in the present article. Id. at § 7-30.4. 
12 Some additional developments also portend increased efforts to implement the com-
parable worth theory. In Connecticut, the legislature has mandated a pilot study of com-
parable worth theory in setting wages for state employees. The AFL-CIO recently decided 
to support the comparable worth theory. Bus. WEEK, Dec. 17, 1979, at 66-69. In Canada, 
the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Ontario has a comparable worth statute 
under consideration as of January 1980. The proposed legislation would amend Chapter 
112 of The Employment Standards Act, 1974, § 33, to read: "No employer ... shall ... 
establish . . . any difference in wages paid to a male and to a female employee employed 
in the same establishment who are performing work of equal value .... "Value would 
be defined as a "composite" of skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions. Id. 
And the Congress has taken a first step towards adoption of equal worth theory in the 
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978) (codified at 5 
U.S.C~A. § 230l(b)(3) (West Supp. 1979)). Section 2301(b)(3) provides: "[E)qual pay 
should be provided for work of equal value with appropriate consideration of both na-
tional and local rates paid by employers in the private sector . . . . " This ambiguous 
language seems to indicate that Congress is not ready to abandon the market as the 
measure of appropriate pay for civil service jobs, yet Congress is concerned about possible 
wage discrimination in the marketplace. 
,. NAS REPORT, supra note 10, at xi. 
" Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 401-02. 
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ited by Title VII. 
Our article focuses primarily on one legal question: Does the 
wage discrimination theory, as sketched by Professor Blumrosen, 
fall within the remedial ambit of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act? Wage Discrimination's factual contentions as to the exis-
tence and universality of wage discrimination deserve equally 
detailed analysis, but we leave that task to scholars of the perti-
nent disciplines, sociology and economics. We will deal with the 
factual contentions of Wage Discrimination only so far as neces-
sary to challenge its central factual conclusion: that a demon-
stration of job separation should lead to a judicial inference of 
wage discrimination. This assertion is crucial to Professor Blum-
rosen's argument because it is the basis for the proposal that in-
cumbents of sex- or race-separated jobs are entitled, by virtue of 
their jobs alone, to higher wages. 15 Because her social science evi-
dence is unpersuasive and her legal analysis is unsound, we con-
clude that the courts and the Congress have been wise in re-
fraining from attempts to impose the "comparable worth" theory 
15 This article will limit its discussion to sex discrimination. Because our discussion 
applies equally to race and sex, it would be redundant to mention both protected groups 
on every occasion. Moreover, notwithstanding Professor Blumrosen's conscientious inclu-
sion of the word "blacks" to balance each mention of women, it appears that the primary 
aim of the EEOC's focus on residual wage differentials is to raise the wages of women 
and not of minority men. The "comparable worth" theory applies only when jobs are . 
female-intensive or minority-intensive, and the extent of job segregation is much greater 
for sex than for race. The EEOC's commissioned NAS REPORT, which is extensively cited 
in Wage Discrimination, explicitly ignores race discrimination, stating as the rationale 
for the omission that "[c]urrent public concern is almost entirely focused on sex-based 
discrimination." NAS REPORT, supra note 10, at xii. Whatever the EEOC's intf>ntions 
may be, one should not lose sight of the fact that in practice Professor Blumrosen's theo-
ries very probably would benefit white women at the expense of men, particularly blacks 
and other minorities. The sole empirical study of a large-scale, judicially-mandated effort 
to end job separation reported that the promotions and new hires opened up by the 
AT&T consent decree went mostly to white women. H. NORTHRUP & J. LARSON, supra 
note 2, at 48, 52-54, 77, 83-99. The relative losses by minority males occurred even though 
eligibility for the AT&T consent decree remedies did not require minority men to show 
that they worked in jobs that were seventy to eighty percent filled by minorities. Profes-
sor Blumrosen's wage discrimination theory, which would impose such eligibility limits 
on minority men, would be even more likely to subject them to relative losses of income. 
Estelle James has performed extensive statistical analyses on national data to predict 
which groups would gain and which would lose income if men's and women's employ-
ment were "integrated." She found that college-educated white women would gain the 
most, and college-educated black women would gain the least. Relative wage losses to 
men would be eight to eighteen percent, with poorly educated white men losing the most, 
and poorly educated black men also suffering large losses. These relative gains and losses 
are all based on the assumption that higher wages for women would not attract more 
women into the labor market. If, as seems likely, more women did enter the labor mar-
ket, the relative gains and losses would be greater. James, Income and Employment Ef-
fects of Women's Liberation, in SEX, D1scR1MINATION, AND THE DIVISION or LABOR 379, 384-
91 (C. Lloyd ed. 1975). 
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on the American economy. 
Before we examine the "comparable worth" theory, Professor 
Blumrosen's central concept must be defined and more accu-
rately labeled. What she- calls "wage discrimination" is the idea 
at the heart of her arguments, but she has used the term ambig-
uously. On the one hand, her idea of wage discrimination seems 
to be16 the earnings difference between sexes and races attribut-
able to the concentration of women and blacks in lower paying 
jobs. "[T]he low rates of pay associated with such· segregated 
jobs constitute the major explanation for the 'earnings gap' be-
tween minority and female workers . . . and white males. This 
gap has long been considered a major benchmark ... of em-
ployment discrimination. " 17 If wage discrimination is merely the 
wage difference between jobs usually held by women and jobs 
usually held by men, it surely exists, 18 but it is not thereby ille-
gal. This first definition of "wage discrimination" is consistent 
with the possibility that jobs are, on the average, paid what they 
are "worth."19 
But Professor Blumrosen relies in large part on a different 
idea. Wage discrimination, she writes, means "rates paid for tra-
ditionally segregated jobs [which are] discriminatorily de-
pressed."20 Under this definition, wage discrimination means 
lower pay for traditionally "female" jobs based on the sex of the 
incumbents, and not because the job is "worth" less than a job 
performed by a male. Such practices would come closer to the 
proscriptions of Title VIl, were it not for the Bennett Amend-
ment, 21 whose effect we dispute with Professor Blumrosen. But it 
is by .no means certain that wage discrimination in this sense 
occurs to any important extent. 
The double-barreled term "wage discrimination" is unsatisfac-
tory for another reason as well. The term is a very close para-
phrase of the language of Title VII, which forbids employers "to 
discriminate ... with respect to ... compensation" between 
sexes and races.22 The term "wage discrimination" thus begs the 
" The concept of wage discrimination "seems to be" rather than "is" because it is 
never defined explicitly. Our discussion of its ambiguity is based on the meanings im-
plicit throughout the text of Wage Discrimination, especially at 399-401. 
" Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 400. 
" Id. at 410-15. 
" "Worth" must be set within quotation marks because, as is explained below at part I 
B, the worth of a job is a concept that has meaning only in reference to the very stan-
dards that Professor Blumrosen rejects. 
,. Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 401. 
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). See part Il infra for an analysis of the effect of the 
Bennett Amendment on Title VII. 
22 Pub. L. ·No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 253 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-
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question, for it supplies an affirmative answer to the central 
question of the entire argument: whether low wages result from 
illegal discrimination. 
This article therefore will employ more exact terms, as the fol-
lowing Figure 1 shows: 
Wage 
Differential 










cr ___ _t_ _____ , 
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L ____ worh") ____ f 
EMPIRICALLY DEMONSTRATED 
BY 
M UL TIP LE REGRESSION STUDIES 
THEORirrlCAL-
NOT DEMONSTRABLE BY 
STATISTICAL 
ANALYSIS 
g· Unequal Pay for 
Equal Work 
(covered by EPA> 
r _____ .J _______ 7 
~ 
____ i ____ 7 ,.,-----L---, 
Unequal Pay For I ~ Pay Disproportionate I 
Work of Equal "Worth" I I to "Worth" of Work I 
L----------~ L --------~ 
Dissection of Wage Differentals 
a= b+c 
c = d +e 
e = f+g+g' 
g = h+i 
15 (1976)). The act provides in pertinent part: 
§ 703(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice fo~ an employer-(1) to fail 
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or 
national origin . . . . 
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"Wage differential" ([a] in Figure 1) is the gross difference in 
wages between jobs traditionally filled by men and women. 
Econometric studies divide the wage differential into two compo-
nents. One component is the sum of all known and measured 
non-discriminatory factors ([b] in Figure 1); the other is the 
"residual wage differential" ([c] in Figure 1). This two-compo-
nent dissection is as far as most statistical analyses are able to 
go. Residual wage differentials are in theory subdividable into 
discriminatory and nondiscriminatory factors. The non-discrimi-
natory factors are those that are unknown, or that are known but 
impractical to measure ([d] in Figure 1).23 The discriminatory 
factors are the effects of job segregation by employers24 ([f] in 
Figure 1) and wage discrimination ( [g] and [g'] in Figure 1). 
To the extent (if any) that "women's" work is paid less than 
"men's" work in amount disproportionate to differences in "true 
worth," wage discrimination occurs ( [g] and [g'] in Figure 1).25 
One form of wage discrimination is unequal pay for equal, i.e., 
identical or very similar, work ( [g'] in Figure 1). This special 
case is the target, and the only target, of the Equal Pay Act of 
1963 (EPA).28 Wage discrimination that does not involve identi-
" Probably the most important of the unmeasurable nondiscriminatory factors is em-
ployee choice, i.e., women choosing occupations that are "worth" less and paid propor-
tionately less than occupations chosen by men. As a practical matter, it is impossible to 
assess the extent to which job segregation is a consequence of discriminatory job assign-
ment by employers ([fl in Figure 1), and the extent to which it is a consequence of em-
ployee choice. Of course, vocational choices are themselves products of an entire cultural 
milieu, which may itself be discriminatory. This article, however, concerns the type of 
discrimination prohibited by Title VII and by the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-
38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(l) (1976)1 [hereinafter cited as EPA). That 
is, it concerns discrimination by employers. Discrimination by the total cultural milieu is 
not "discriminatory" within the meaning of the Jaw, so it falls within section [d I of Fig-
ure 1. 
" Hereinafter "job segregation" will mean "job segregation by employers" unless oth-
erwise specified. See note 23 supra and note 45 infra. 
Note the distinction between discrimination due to job segregation and wage discrimi-
nation. A woman discriminatorily assigned to a low status job that is paid in proportion 
to its true "worth" suffers only discrimination due to job segregation. If she is non-dis-
criminatorily assigned to a job that is paid less in proportion to its true "worth" than 
"men's" jobs are paid, she suffers only wage discrimination. If she is discriminatorily 
assigned to a job whose true "worth" is less than that of the job she would have obtained 
in the absence of discrimination, and the wage for her job is less in proportion to its 
"worth" than the wage for "men's" jobs, then she suffers both from job segregation and 
from wage discrimination . 
.. This definition is the idea intended by Professor Blumrosen's definition quoted in 
the text accompanying note 20 supra. 
" See note 23 supra. The EPA provides in part: 
No employer having employees subject to any provision of this section shall dis-
criminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, be-
tween employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such estab-
lishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the 
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cal male and female jobs is the object of "equal worth" or "com-
parable worth" theory ([g] in Figure 1). It may consist of une-
qual pay for different jobs that are equal in "worth" ( [h] in Figure 
1), or it may consist of pay that is disproportionately unequal to 
differences in true job worth, e.g., a male is paid one hundred 
percent more than a woman for a job that is alleged to be "worth" 
only fifty percent more ( [i] in Figure 1). 
Although Wage Discrimination is a long article, its argument 
may be summarized simply. First, Wage Discrimination points 
out that women and blacks work mainly in certain sectors of the 
economy.27 Jobs filled by women and blacks tend to be low-wage 
jobs, and according to the article, the low wages cannot entirely 
be explained as the result of the several legitimate reasons for 
lower pay that are known to be associated with women and black 
workers.28 Women's work, it is said, has always and everywhere 
been devalued, and the devaluation has resulted in lower wage 
rates for women and blacks than for white men.29 The exclusion 
of women from "men's" jobs - "job segregation" - has been so 
intimately linked to discriminatory devaluation of women's work 
that, the author states, the two are really one and the same: 
Thus, job segregation has an integral characteristic, the 
assignment of lower values to the jobs which are available 
to · minorities and women than would otherwise be the 
case. This evidence establishes that it is more likely than 
not that where job segregation exists, the wages of those 
jobs assigned to minorities and women have been de-
pressed by virtue of the fact of their minority or female 
status.30 
opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of 
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed 
under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant 
to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earn-
ings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any 
other factor other than sex: Provided, That an employer who is paying a wage 
rate differential in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with 
the provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee. 
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(ll (1976). 
27 Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 402-10. 
20 Id. at 410-15. The legitimate reasons that account for at least part of the sex differ-
entials in wages and earnings are the lesser overtime worked by women, the more fre-
quent employment of women on a part-time basis, the different kinds of training, educa-
tion and counseling acquired by women, and the lesser work experience of the average 
woman worker. Id. at 414. 
21 Id. at 415-28. 
'° Id. at 427-28. 
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Wage Discrimination then sets forth a theory of the means by 
which employers allegedly translate their devaluation of the 
work of women and minorities into low wages. 31 Employers set 
wages by two principal standards: internal comparison of the 
"worth" of each job as compared to other jobs within the enter-
prise, and external comparison with the job market. Neither 
standard is immune from discrimination. Internal comparisons 
necessarily are subjective, and if those who set the wages devalue 
the work of women, their judgments will reflect their prejudices. 
Setting wages by rates prevailing in the external job market im-
ports whatever collective stereotypes and prejudices infect the 
economy as a whole. Wage Discrimination acknowledges that in 
classical economic theory the job market values each job at its 
true worth to the employer, but the article criticizes the classical 
theory as outmoded. 32 
In a brief but very important section, Wage Discrimination 
summarizes eight published and unpublished econometric stud-
ies of sex and race differentials in wages.33 By a statistical tech-
nique known as multiple regression analysis,34 the authors of 
these studies were able to account for zero percent to fifty-five 
percent of the gross wage differentials between sexes and races. 35 
The remaining wage differentials, which the present article 
terms the residual wage differentials, have not evaporated under 
the spotlight of multiple regression analysis. Wage Discrimina-
tion assumes that these residual wage differentials must be the 
fruits of illegal discrimination and contends that wage discrimi-
nation must be presumed to exist whenever jobs are occupied 
largely by members of one sex and/or race. This article will show. 
that the assumption is mistaken and that the contention there-
fore fails. 
Part II of Professor Blumrosen's article is devoted to argu-
•• Id. at 428-57. 
32 Id. at 445-54. In classical economic theory, the job market awards wages to each job 
according to its true worth, which is proportional to the value of the contribution of work-
ers doing each job to the enterprise as a whole. If an employer offers less than the "true" 
value, competitors will outbid it for the available workers; if it offers more than the true 
value, the enterprise will lose money and become insolvent. The criticisms of this so-
called "invisible hand" all argue that, although the "law of supply and demand" may 
prevail in the aggregate and in the long run, it is subject to local perturbations and im-
perfections, including those resulting from imperfect competition (monopoly, oligopoly, 
monopsony) and from prejudice, stereotype, and custom. Wage Discrimination's ex-
tended review of economic theory supports only a single contention: that the market 
value of a job may be more or less than its "true" economic worth. 
33 Id. at 454-56. 
"' See text accompanying note 85 infra. 
35 Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 456, Table 1. 
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ments that residual wage differentials are prohibited by Title 
VIl38 and that this prohibition is not restricted by the Bennett 
Amendment, 37 a statutory provision that many courts have inter-
preted as limiting wage discrimination claims brought under Ti-
tle VII to the scope of the Equal Pay Act.38 Her theory would not 
require a plaintiff doing a traditional "women's" job to show 
that she was paid less than she rightfully should have been 
paid.39 The plaintiff would have to show only that her job was 
"segregated," i.e., that more than seventy or eighty percent of 
the incumbents were female or minority.40 In such cases, the 
workers would be entitled to an injunction41 raising their pay un-
less the employer could prove that it would pay no more for the 
job if the employees were male. "Evidence of segregated jobs," 
Professor Blumrosen asserts, "justifies an inference of discrimi-
nation in compensation."42 
Finally, Wage Discrimination considers the problem of reme-
dies. The article recognizes that the amount of the residual wage 
differential may be indeterminate in any particular instance, but 
it argues that the courts should provide a remedy anyway. 43 If 
the exact amount cannot be specified, the courts can apply gen-
eral principles, especially the alleged findings of economists that 
"[f]rom 20% to 50% of the wage differential between men and 
women has been attributed to factors which cannot be justified 
on grounds unrelated to discrimination."44 Alternatively, the 
court could require the use of a "reformed" job evaluation sys-
tem to rewrite the employer's wage and salary structure.45 The 
present article will argue that such remedies would be grossly 
,. Id. at 457-501. 
37 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). 
"' See cases cited in notes 175-76 infra. 
,. Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 457-59, 466. 
•• Id. at 461. 
" Id. at 490. 
" Id. at 465. 
" Id. at 495-98. 
" Id. at 497 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 500. The earnings of women in 1973 
were about fifty-seven percent of men's earnings, id. at 410 n.52, so an injunction to 
eliminate the twenty to fifty percent of the differential that Professor Blumrosen attrib-
utes to discrimination would mean pay raises of fifteen to thirty-eight percent (((100-57) 
X .2) + 57 = 15%; ((100-57) X .5) + 57 = 37.7%). 
" Id. at 494. We use the term "separation" rather than Professor Blumrosen's term 
"segregation" because we reserve the latter term to describe discriminatory actions by 
employers. Male-intensive and female-intensive jobs also can occur as the result·of appli-
cant choice, even in the face of substantial efforts by employers to integrate the work 
force. As we shall use the terms, job separation-the existence of female-intensive 
jobs-includes the effects both of applicant choices and of discriminatory actions by em-
ployers. We will use the term "segregation" to refer only to employer actions. See notes 
23-24 supra. 
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unfair and impracticable, and would cause a drastic and unde-
sirable upheaval in the American economy. 
I. THE EXISTENCE OF WAGE OISCRIMINATION 
The component of residual wage differentials that Professor 
Blumrosen calls "wage discrimination" is a concept far removed 
from such everyday facts as "wages" or "hours of work." It is a 
theoretical idea rather like Adam Smith's "invisible hand,"46 like 
the inevitability of socialism in Marxist theory, 47 and like 
Keynes' multiplier value of government expenditures:48 that is, 
residual wage differential is an inference based on the applica-
tion of multi-layered, complex and co~troversial theory to a 
broad range of facts. Wage Discrimination asserts that residual 
wage differentials are so conclusively established and so univer-
sal that the courts are forced, as a practical matter, to order 
wage increases for all jobs in which women or minorities are con-
centrated, for the presumption of discrimination is, in effect, ir-
rebuttable.49 Wage Discrimination would lift the burden of prov-
ing discriminatory· wage differentials from plaintiffs and place on 
employers the burden of proving the negative. For example, an 
electrical contractor paying craft workers (mostly male electri-
cians) more than clerical workers (mostly female clerks and 
bookkeepers) would be presumed to be discriminating against 
the clerical workers unless the employer could demonstrate that 
no part of the wage differential was attributable to discrimina-
tion. The contractor could cite neither traditional job evaluation 
' 
" A, SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS Book IV, ch. II (1776). See P. SAMUELSON, Eco-
NOMICS 728-29, 840-41 (10th ed. 1976). 
" K. MARX, DAS KAPITAL (1867, 1885, 1894). See generally J. RoBINSON, EssAY ON 
MARXISM 954 n.15 (London 1942, 1964); P. SAMUELSON, supra note 46, at 865, 
"J. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY (1936). See 
P. SAMUELSON, supra note 46, at 244. 
11 Wage Discrimination's argument is as follows: (1) Sex and race discrimination has 
existed and still exists. (2) One form of discrimination is job segregation, for example, 
hiring all male crafts workers and all female clerks. (3) Another form of discrimination is 
wage discrimination, that is, paying less for jobs performed by women or minorities than 
would be paid if those jobs were performed by white men. (4) Because job segregation is 
still quite prevalent, it is likely that wage discrimination is also still the rule rather than 
the exception. (5) The statistical technique of multiple regression analysis can identify 
wage differences attributable to legitimate factors such as education and experience; the 
remaining, unexplained statistical variance-residual wage differential-must be attribu-
table to wage discrimination. (6) Econometric studies have demonstrated residual wage 
differentials. (7) Therefore, to make a prima facie case of wage discrimination, a plaintiff 
should have to show only that she or he works in a job category occupied mainly by 
women or minorities. 
However, the prima facie case is irrebuttable as a practical matter. See part m A 1 
infra. 
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studies nor prevailing wages in the marketplace in its defense, 
because both are allegedly infected with discrimination. 50 Profes-
sor Blumrosen boldly asserts that wage discrimination is so uni-
versally pervasive and proven as to warrant shifting the burden 
of proof, mandating a decision for the employee unless the em-
ployer can prove the negative. The employer's burden, as we will 
show below, would be an impossible one. But the structure of 
theory and fact upon which the claim is asserted to rest will not 
bear its weight. 
A. The Inadequacy of Wage Discrimination's Facts and 
Analysis 
In Section I, 51 Wage Discrimination cites statistics that show 
that jobs are to a very considerable degree still separated, i.e., 
women are employed - by choice or compulsion - in different 
jobs from men, and most women's jobs pay less. This is indis-
putable, but it tells us nothing about why most women's jobs 
pay less. Among the several possibilities are (1) most women 
choose jobs that are "worth" less than most "men's" jobs; and 
(2) women are often discriminatorily assigned to jobs that are 
"worth" less than most men's jobs.52 Wage Discrimination does 
not attempt to choose among the possibilities. 
Part I B53 is entitled "Links Between Job Segregation and 
Wage Discrimination," but the reader finds therein nothing on 
"links": no examples of linkage and no theory of linkage. Rather, 
part I B consists of three independent subsections. 
Subsection 1,54 "The Findings of Social Sciences and Empiri-
cal Studies," summarizes sociological and anthropological evi-
dence that invidious stereotypes of women and "women's work" 
are widespread in Western and other cultures. Such stereotypes 
are probably a necessary precondition of wage discrimination, 
but the existence of sexual prejudice hardly establishes "links" 
between job separation and wage discrimination. Proof of linkage 
is crucial to Wage Discrimination's argument, for the article pro-
poses that occurrence of female-intensive work raises a legal pre-
sumption of wage discrimination. In this subsection, Wage Dis-
'° Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 429-41, 445-46. 
" Id. at 402-15. 
02 We agree with Wage Discrimination that jobs which are unequal in "worth" should 
be paid unequally. We also agree with Wage Discrimination that if women are consigned 
to jobs of less worth because of their sex, they have a legal right to promotion under Title 
VII. 
53 Id. at 415-28. 
" Id. at 415-20. 
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crimination cites not only scholarly studies, but also political 
documents55 and a work of popular polemics.56 Yet the subsection 
only asserts - without establishing or citing any authority that 
purports to establish - a linkage between female-intensive jobs 
and wage discrimination. We have made our own search for 
linkage between job separation and wage discrimination; such 
evidence as we have found indicates an absence of linkage.57 
Subsection 2, 58 "The Persistence of Stereotypes," reiterates 
that sex stereotypes do exist and are persistent. This subsection 
deals with quite global beliefs such as the belief that "a woman's 
primary commitment is to her family. "59 But demonstration that 
such beliefs exist, even that they are widespread among both 
men and women, is logically far removed from the proposition to 
be proved: that female-intensive jobs are ipso facto underpaid 
jobs, that is, that job separation and wage discrimination are 
linked. 80 
.. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY AND TREATMENT 
FOR WOMEN WORKERS, REPORT VIlI (Int'! Labour Conference, 60th Sess., 1975), cited in 
Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 417 n.88. 
11 K. MILLETT, SEXUAL POLITICS (1970), cited in Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 
416 n.86. See also id. at 420 n.99. 
17 Professional sports is one of the very few types of employment in which available 
statistics permit independent estimates of job segregation and wage discrimination. The 
economists Pascal and Rapping have applied an exceptionally elaborate multiple regres-
sion analysis to the statistics of major league baseball performance, salary, and race. 
They found strong evidence of job segregation, both as to entry into the major leagues 
(some qualified minority players were still excluded) and as to job assignment (e.g., fifty-
three percent of outfielders but only nine percent of pitchers were black). But job segre-
gation was not linked to wage discrimination. Pascal and Rapping found no evidence of 
wage discrimination. Black players, on the average, earned more than whites and were 
more valuable players as measured by hits, runs, and other pertinent categories. Pascal 
& Rapping, The Economics of Racial Discrimination in Organized Baseball, in RACIAL 
DISCRIMINATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 119 (A. Pascal ed. 1972). Wage Discrimination cites the 
book in which this study was published, Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 447 n.191. 
but the author apparently overlooked the negative implications of the Pascal-Rapping 
study for her thesis. 
Of course, one analysis of race discrimination is hardly conclusive even as regards race, -
let alone sex discrimination. But the Pascal-Rapping study is significant because it is the 
only empirical analysis located by either Professor Blumrosen or the present writers that 
provides direct evidence as to the existence or lack of linkage, between job segregation 
and wage discrimination. When the only direct evidence points to a lack of linkage, 
courts cannot be expected to rule that a showing of job segregation warrants a presump-
tion of wage discrimination. 
11 Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 420-21. 
"Id. at 420. 
'° The only truly pertinent evidence cited in this subsection is contrary to Wage Dis-
crimination's thesis. The article's handling of this evidence is revealing. Id. at 420 n.100. 
The article notes that the NAS REPORT, supra note 10, summarized a social psychological 
experiment in which men and women evaluated the job of administrative assistant. Some 
of the male and female evaluators were told that the job incumbent was male; others 
were told that the incumbent was female. 
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Subsection 3,81 "The Factor of Historical Overt Wage Discrim-
ination," gives examples of disproportionate wages from the pe-
riod of the Second World War, thirty-five to forty years ago.82 
The history is interesting, but hardly conclusive as to the degree, 
or even the existence, of wage discrimination in the 1980's. Yet 
Wage Discrimination concludes that "[t]his evidence establishes 
that it is more likely than not that where job segregation exists, 
the wages of those jobs assigned to minorities and women have 
been depressed by virtue of their minority or female status."83 
The inadequacy of such evidence will be apparent if one 
imagines the same sort of reasoning applied in a slightly differ-
ent context. Suppose an age discrimination plaintiff asserts that 
he is underpaid. His evidence is that sociologists have found 
widespread devaluation of old people in American society. His-
torically, he demonstrates, derogatory stereotypes of older people 
were prevalent for many years, even as recently as the Second 
World War. Therefore, he asserts, "this evidence establishes that 
it is more likely than not that the wages of older people, myself 
specifically, have been depressed on the' basis of age." Discrimi-
nation is so much more likely than not, the plaintiff argues, that 
the court ought to presume it unless the employer can rebut the 
presumption: every older employee ought to have his or her pay 
raised by court order unless the employer can prove that each 
would have been paid no more if he or she were younger. The 
burden of proof would often be impossible, and almost all older 
employees would get raises, regardless of the fairness of their 
pay.M 
The sex of the hypothetical administrative assistant made no difference to the evalu-
ators. Men who were told that the administrative assistant was a man rated the job no 
higher than did men who were told that the administrative assistant was a woman. The 
only sex difference observed was that men rated the job somewhat higher than did 
women - regardless of the sex of the incumbent. Arvey, Passino, & Lounsbury, Job 
Analysis Results as Influenced by Sex of Incumbent and Sex of Analyst, 62 J. APP. 
PSYCH. 411 (1977). 
Wage Discrimination describes these facts but ignores the implications, which run 
counter to that article's thesis. Instead, Wage Discrimination surmises that the experi-
mental results may demonstrate self-hatred on the part of women, because "(w)omen 
tended to grade more harshly." Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 420 n.100. That 
inference would have had some support if women had evaluated the administrative assis-
tant job lower ("more harshly") when they were told that the incumbent was a woman. 
But since the women evaluators rated the job the same regardless of the sex of the in-
cumbent, Wage Discrimination's speculation about "self-hatred" has no logical basis at 
all. 
11 Id. at 421-28. 
•• For additional details on this period, see Clive, Women Workers in World War II: 
Michigan As a Test Case, 20 LAB. HIST. No. 1, at 5 (1979). 
13 Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 427-28. 
" The analogy is less than perfect, however, in one important respect. Many older 
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The last section of part I, "Translation of Discriminatory De-
valuation Into Lower Pay Rates,"65 begins by describing how 
prejudice could operate to reduce wages for women's jobs. Job 
evaluation systems require the exercise of judgment. If the per-
sons making judgments are biased, their job evaluation decisions 
may reflect their biases.66 The subsequent subsections theorize 
that it would be possible for bias to enter into the determination 
of wages by other routes: through reliance on other employers' 
pay scales, 67 through the continuation of historically biased wage 
rates, ax or through collective bargaining by biased repre-
sentatives. 69 
These are plausible theories, but they do not help the reader 
- or the courts - to answer the critical questions: does wage 
discrimination exist in the wage structures of particular employ-
ers, and if so, which employers, and how much wage discrimina-
tion? Theories that suggest, however plau!,ibly, that biases can 
enter into the setting of wages have the same limitation as the 
following analysis of predatory pricing in the antitrust context: 
(1) merchants can attempt to gain a monopoly by predatory 
pr1cmg; (2) several methods exist of implementing predatory 
pricing; (3) in the past, many merchants have used predatory 
pricing; (4) it seems probable that many merchants are using 
predatory pricing now; (5) therefore, the courts should presume 
that every merchant accused by its competitors of predatory pric-
ing is liable for damages unless it can prove otherwise. The logi-
cal defect is that none of the four propositions, nor all of them 
combined, logically warrants the conclusion, which is the analog 
of Wage Discrimination's proposed presumption that all 
"women's" jobs are paid less than their true "worth." 
Subsections 6 and 770 review the controversies among theoreti-
cal economists as to residual wage differentials. Professor Blum-
rosen acknowledges that in the classical economic theory of free 
people work in jobs identical to those done by younger people, and for equal pay. In those 
situations, the employer can prove fairness by demonstrating equal pay for equal work. 
In Wage Discrimination's comparable worth theory, the male and female jobs are differ-
ent by definition (the theory applies only to comparisons of different jobs), so direct com-
parisons of wage rates would prove nothing. 
,. Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 428-57. 
11 Job evaluation systems require judgments at the levels of job analysis, job descrip-
tion, and selection and weighting of compensable factors. Bias could distort any of these 
judgments. Id. at 428-41. 
" Id. at 441-43. 
'" Id. at 443-44. 
" Id. at 444-45. 
70 Id. at 445-54. 
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markets, discrimination on the basis of sex is impossible.71 Of 
course, sex discrimination does occur, so neoclassical economists 
have posited that employers may discriminate at least-insofar as 
they are willing to pay for the exercise of their "taste" for dis-
crimination by earning lower profits,72 or insofar as they are 
forced into discrimination by the discriminatory "tastes" of male 
employees, or by their perceptions of employees' preferences.73 
The classical and neoclassical economic theorists have been 
challenged by competing theories which predict that employers 
can, in some circumstances of imperfect competition, profit by 
paying women proportionately less than men.74 The bearing of 
these several economic theories on the issue for which they are 
cited might be summed up as follows. Economists disagree: some 
theories allow coexistence between the profit motive and wage 
discrimination; others do not. 
The entire argument of Wage Discrimination up to this point 
is theoretical and inferential, a series of permutations of one ba-
sic theme. That theme is: (1) prejudice against women is wide-
spread; (2) prejudice against women could result in dispropor-
tionately low wages for women's jobs; (3) therefore, the wages for 
women's jobs probably are lower than would be the case if the 
jobs were performed by men. While each premise is plausible, 
the syllogism is hardly conclusive and, most importantly, offers 
no hint as to how much disproportion in wages exists or which 
employers are paying disproportionately. If, as Wage Discrimina-
tion contends, Title VII prohibits residual wage differentials, the 
prohibition would have to remain a dead letter unless the courts 
could determine which employers are underpaying "women's" 
jobs, and by how much the jobs are underpaid. 
The final section75 of Wage Discrimination's part I is therefore 
of great importance to its thesis. In the entire 101-page article, 
only these four pages cite data that allegedly bear directly on the 
assessment of residual wage differentials in modern business en-
terprises. 76 It is surprising that this brief section consists of little 
" Id. at 446. 
72 Id. at 446-47. The leading theoretical work of this persuasion, G. BECKER, THE Eco-
NOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed 1971), has been cogently criticized in J. MADDEN, THE 
ECONOMICS OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 37-39, 42-48, 105-06 (1973). 
13 Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 447-48. 
" Id. at 448-54. 
,. Id. at 454-57. 
71 In other contexts, Wage Discrimination cites extensively to a report that contains 
such data, U.S. CoMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SOCIAL INDICATORS OF EQUALITY FOR MINORITIES 
AND WOMEN (1978) (cited by Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at nn.17, 21, 22, 23, 25, 
50, 56, 58, 68, 78, 82, & 232). But Wage Discrimination does not review the multiple 
regression analyses cited in this report. 
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more than an attempt to explain away the findings of the 
econometric studies, for they run contrary to Professor Blum-
rosen's thesis.77 Even more surprising is the fact that the studies 
to which she refers do not attempt to separate wage discrimina-
tion from discriminatory job assignment.78 The economic studies 
Wage Discrimination cites are, therefore, irrelevant to its thesis. 
The author is simply incorrect when she asserts: "These studies 
confirm that there is a significant relationship between job segre-
. gation and wage discrimination against the minorities and 
women holding the segregated jobs. "71 The economic studies do 
not and could not support any such conclusion, as will be 
demonstrated below.80 
77 Professor Blumrosen does not specify the particular economic studies to which she 
refers in Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, et 454-55, es running counter to her thesis. 
She writes, "(t]hese studies have used," "many of the studies, however," "these analy-
ses," "the analyst," "[t]hese studies tended," and "(t]he studies rarely examined," id. et 
454, without citing any of the primary sources she hes in mind. 
19 Wage Discrimination refers, through a summary in a secondary source, to primary 
sources, some unpublished, by Blinder, Cohen, Fuchs, Melkiel & Melkiel, end Oaxaca. 
Id. et 456 n.220, Table 1. These studies do not separate wage discrimination from dis-
criminatory job assignment. See note 85 infra. 
1• Id. et 454 . 
.. It may be noted that the tone of Wage Discrimination's section on economic analyses 
is apologetic. Although it makes one flat (but incorrect) statement that economic analy-
ses support the existence of wage discrimination, see id. et 454 & nn.33 & 92, the bulk of 
conclusory language in this section attempts to explain away embarrassing results: 
These studies have used varying methods end different date which make com-
parisons difficult .... Many of the studies, however, defined discrimination to 
include only actions motivated by ill will. Discrimination identified by a showing 
of adverse effect on minorities end women is excluded from these analyses . . . . 
Hence, the conclusions reached may be understated . . . . The studies rarely 
examined the interaction of wage discrimination end restrictions on upward mo-
bility together, which hes been the focus of Pert I of this article. 
Id. et 454. This assertion is not only en "explaining away" qualification, it is also inaccu-
rate. All of the econometric studies cited by Wage Discrimination consider job segrega-
tion end wage discrimination together. Professor Blumrosen's reel complaint is not that 
the studies failed to examine job segregation end wage discrimination "together," but 
rather that the two were examined together, not separately. But es explained in pert I of 
the present article, lumping together of job segregation end wage discrimination (if it 
occurs) is inherent in econometric methods. Wage Discrimination continues: "[M]uch of 
the difference between the studies is explainable because of different notions of whet are 
legitimate productivity characteristics. One~s choice of variables, in feet, can eliminate 
discrimination completely." Id. et 455. 
The section on economic analyses then concludes with en entire paragraph of 
qualification: 
Id. 
[T]he economists' judgment . . . may be useful . . . subject to the cautionary 
note . . . suggested above . . . . [N)o mechanical application . . . would be ap-
propriate. At the most, the economists' views might provide a useful starting 
point in the shaping of a remedy which will be based on the facts before the 
court, not abstract economic consideretio~s. 
Even if the econometric study of multiple regression residuals did tend to support 
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Wage Discrimination's citation of the economic literature con-
sists of three secondary sources which review a substantial num-
ber of econometric research studies. 81 The studies all attempt to 
dissect the gross earnings differentials among sexes and/or races 
into components. Some components clearly are legitimate: for 
example, women are employed on the average fewer hours than 
men, hence they earn less.82 The legitimacy of some other statis-
tical correlates of wage differentials is open to question. For ex-
ample, older blacks have, on the average, less education than 
older whites, and the racial earnings gap is largest among older 
workers.83 Thus, statistically speaking, education "explains" part 
Wage Discriminntion's position, no conclusions could be drawn with the certainty that 
courts would require before talcing an enormous leap into judicial restructuring of the 
economy. Economists are aware that statistics have their limitations as well as their uses. 
For example, in a book cited by Wage Discriminntion, economists Wohlstetter and Cole-
man conclude: 
These examples suggest how hard it is to disentangle the effects of current dis-
crimination in the marketplace from the various results of multiple past discrim-
inations that may in turn have made it unlikely that a minority can compete 
currently on equal terms . . . . The proportion of the current income differences 
that is attributable to current discrimination in the marketplace is extremely 
difficult to determine and, in spite of several attempts, does not seem to us to 
have been measured convincingly. 
Wohlstetter & Coleman, Race Differences in Income, in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN Eco-
NOMIC LIFE 3, 44-45 (A. Pascal ed. 1972), cited in Wage Discriminntion, supra note 1, at 
447 n.191. 
In sum, part I of Wage Discriminntion attempts to establish wage discrimination as a 
fact, but it consists of fifty-four pages of abstract theory and general induction, and only 
a little more than one page of references to secondary data sources. Neither the secondary 
sources nor the studies on which the secondary sources are based support Wage Discrimi-
nation's theory. As Wage Discriminntion obliquely recognizes, the most that can be said 
of the economic studies is that they do not disprove the wage discrimination hypothesis. 
Thus the answer to the questions, "Does wage discrimination exist, and if so, how much, 
and in what companies and jobs?" is: no one knows. The wage discrimination idea is 
novel and untested. It is, in fact, untestable by any economic or statistical method now 
known. Wage discrimination must remain merely an abstraction until a method is dis-
covered to measure the "true worth" of jobs. No such method has yet appeared on the 
horizon. 
" The secondary sources cited in Wage Discriminntion, supra note 1, at 454-56 nn.218-
20, are Kahne & Kohen, Economic Perspectives on the Role of Women in the American 
Economy, 13 J. EcoN. LIT. 1249 (1975); Marshall, The Economics of Racial Discriminn-
tion: A Survey, 12 J. EcoN. LIT. 849 (1974); and Oaxaca, Theory and Measurement in the 
Economics of Discrimination, in EQUAL RIGHTS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (L. Hausman, 
0. Ashenfelter, B. Rustin, R. Shubert, & D. Sleiman eds. 1977). 
•• Cohen, Sex Differences in Compensation, 6 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 434, 442-43 (1971). 
Cohen's econometric analysis reported that, among nonprofessional men and women em-
ployed full time, the average workweek for men was more than 10% longer than for wo-
men. The greater number of hours worked by men accounted for about 20~;;, of the differ-
ence between the sexes in gross earnings. The proportion of the earnings gap accounted 
for would be greater,if premium overtime pay were talcen into consideration . 
., See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARAC-
TERISTICS OF THE OLDER POPULATION: 1978 (Special Studies Series P-23, No. 85, 1979), at 
16, Table 14 (education and race) & 24-27, Tables 22-24 (income and race); F. DAVIS, TuE 
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of racial earnings differences. Whether educational differences 
justify earnings differences morally or legally is a question that 
the economists recognize as beyond the scope of their statistical 
analysis. At least one component of statistical dissection clearly 
represents illegal discrimination: unequal pay for equal work, 
when experience, seniority, and productivity are also equal. But, 
as acknowledged in one of the reviews that Wage Discrimination 
cites, this practice is so rare that it is of little or no practical 
consequence. 84 
The statistical technique of such dissections is multiple regres-
sion analysis. The economist gathers a number of data about 
each employee, for example, sex, race, age, education, experi-
ence, seniority, and geographic region, as well as earnings. Al-
though no two employees are identical, multiple regression· al-
lows the statistician to estimate what earnings would have been 
if the employees were identical in every respect measured except 
the variables of interest, e.g., sex and race.85 
Statistical dissection cannot separate the effects of job separa-
tion from wage discrimination. Consider, for example, the elec-
trical contractor, mentioned above, which pays its crafts work-
ers, primarily male electricians, more than its clerical workers, 
BLACK COMMUNITY'S SOCIAL SECURITY 71 (1978) ("The ratio of Black to White median 
income is highest in the 14 to 24 age group and consistently declines for each age level 
down to, and including, the 55 to 64 age group."). 
•• Kahne & Kohen, supra note 81, at 1261, cited in Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, 
at 454 n.218. 
85 It must be emphasized that multiple regression yields estimates, which are subject 
to error. Among the several sources of error is the fact that the statistical model makes 
assumptions that are unlikely to be correct. For example, multiple regression assumes 
linear correlations: if education is quantified as number of years of schooling, the tech-
nique assumes that the difference between a second grade and a fifth grade education is 
worth exactly as much as the difference between a ninth grade and a twelfth grade edu-
cation. The technique also assumes homoscedasticity (homogeneous distribution of vari-
ance) and a number of other statistical symmetries that are unlikely to exist in real-
world data. Perhaps most important, multiple regression cannot distinguish the effects of 
discrimination from the effects of legitimate factors that it was not possible to measure. 
For example, the personnel files of many employers record college degrees but not fields 
of study. An econometric study based on such files is forced to count an assistant control-
ler with an M.B.A. in accounting and finance as "equal" in education to a junior ac-
countant with an M.S.W. (master's degree in social welfare). Only one of the eleven re-
sults reported in Wage Discrimination, supra note· 1, at 456 n.220, Table 1, controlled for 
field of study, and that one study, Malkiel & Malkiel, omitted such pertinent control 
variables as age and race. The differences identified as "unexplained differential" in 
Wage Discrimination's Table 1 are not estimates of discrimination, as is incorrectly as-
serted in note b to Table 1. The "unexplained differential" consists of estimates of the 
, effects of discrimination plus all unmeasured legitimate sources of wage differences. In 
drawing attention to these limitations, we do not mean to disparage multiple regression 
or its economist practitioners, but to draw attention to limitations inherent in the tech-
nique, limitations which Wage Discrimination passes over rather casually, id. at 455. 
These limitations are further discussed in part I B 1 c infra. 
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primarily female clerks and bookkeepers. A multiple regression 
analysis might dispose of part of the gross earnings difference by 
legitimate factors, 88 but in all probability, there would remain a 
substantial "residual" difference. The residual difference con-
sists of three components that can be identified theoretically, 
but which cannot be separated in the realm of real-life data. One 
component of the "residual" is the sum of all unmeasured legiti-
mate reasons for wage differences.87 A second component is the 
effect of discriminatory job assignment. That is, if (1) the electri-
cian's job is "worth" more than the job of clerk, (2) both jobs are 
paid what they are worth, and (3) absent discrimination, some of 
the female clerks would have been electricians, then ( 4) the f e-
m ale clerks who would have been electricians have lost wages 
because of discriminatory job assignment.88 The last component 
of the statistical residual is that portion, if any, due to wage dis-
crimination. For example, the work of the clerk may be equal in 
"worth" to the work .of the electrician, but may be paid only 
two-thirds as much, or the clerk's job may be "worth" two-thirds 
as much as the electrician's but may be paid only one-half as 
much. This is the "pure wage discrimination" referred to in 
Wage Discrimination. 89 
81 For example, the electricians may work a longer workweek, more overtime, and in 
less pleasant surroundings than the clerks . 
., See FIGURE 1 in text following note 22 supra. 
" Statistical analyses tend to overestimate the magnitude of employer job segregation 
because no means is available to separate the effects of job segregation by employers 
from job segregation by choice of individual employees. Professor Blumrosen acknowl-
edges, as do almost all commentators, that in American society women have been condi-
tioned to enter traditional "women's" vocations by the entire social milieu. Wage Dis-
crimination, supra note 1, at 416-21. See also J. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC 
PURPOSE 37 (1973); Cohen, Sex Differences in Compensation, 6 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 434, 
437-38 (1971); Fuchs, Differences in Hourly Earnings Between Men and Women, 
MONTHLY LAB. REv., May 1971, at 9; Lloyd, The Division of Labor Between the Sexes: A 
Review, in SEX, DISCRJMINATION, AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR, supra note 15, at 1, 15; 
Sawhill, The Economics of Discrimination Against Women: Some New Findings, 8 J. 
HUMAN RESOURCES 383, 391 (1973); Stephenson, Relative Wages and Sex Segregation by 
Occupation, in SEX, DISCRIMINATION, AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR, supra note 15, at 175, 
197-98; Gwartney & Stroup, Measurement of Employment Discrimination According to 
Sex, 39 SOUTHERN EcoN. J. 575 (1973). If the hypothetical electrical contractor's electri-
cians are almost all male, that job segregation may be partly the result of the employer's 
discriminatory rejection of qualified female electricians and partly the result of a lack of 
female applicants for electrician jobs. The employer is legally accountable only for the 
former, but statistical studies, unable to distinguish between employer preferences and 
applicant choices, frequently lump the two together and attribute the entirety of job seg-
regation to employer discrimination. In practice, applicant choice is a powerful factor. 
See, e.g., H. NORTHRUP & J. LARSON, supra note 15, at 60-64 (extensive recruiting neces-
sary to attract modest number of female "outside" electrical craft trainees; program suf-
fers heavy female attrition). 
•• Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 455-56 n.22O. 
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Economists who have studied discrimination generally have 
not attempted to measure the "worth" of jobs independently of 
wage rates.90 No yardstick exists by which such measurements 
could be made.91 Without an independent measure of job worth, 
it is impossible to distinguish statistically between the results of 
job separation and the results of "pure" wage discrimination. 
Moreover, as noted above, none of the forms of discrimination 
can be dissected statistically from legitimate but unassessed rea-
sons for different pay. Consequently, Wage Discrimination's 
reading of the economic literature is seriously misleading. The 
literature shows no "significant relationship between job segrega-
tion and wage discrimination. " 92 The literature does not even 
demonstrate that "pure" wage discrimination exists, nor do 
Wage Discrimination's economic authorities purport to do so.93 
The most that multiple regression analyses can tell us is that 
some of the gross earnings differences between the sexes are ac-
counted for legitimately, while the remainder must result from 
unmeasured legitimate sources, and/or from job separation, and/ 
or from wage discrimination. 
B. Problems With Wage Discrimination's Factual Thesis 
In its Part I, Wage Discrimination attempts to establish "the 
factual aspects of the thesis that wage rates of jobs into which 
women and minorities have been historically segregated are 
likely to be depressed because those jobs are occupied by 'disfa-
vored groups.' "9' This factual proposition is demonstrated, ac-
cording to Wage Discrimination, by "historical, anthropological, 
sociological, and economic studies."95 In summarizing Wage Dis-
crimination's evidence, the present article has drawn attention 
to some of the most apparent inadequacies of reasoning and of 
evidence. However, the defects of Wage Discrimination's analy-
sis run deeper than the flawed logic and thin evidence that 
would warrant a "not proven" verdict. More fundamentally, the 
00 See, e.g., SEX, DISCRIMINATION, AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR, supra note 15; WOMEN IN 
THE LABOR MARKET (C. Lloyd, E. Andrews, & C. Gilroy eds. 1979). 
11 See part I B 1 c infra. 
12 Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 454. 
" The economic studies cited by Wage Discrimination (see note 78 supra) calculate 
"unexplained differential" in wages between men and women or between whites and 
blacks. Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 456 n.220, Table 1. The "unexplained dif-
ferential" includes unmeasured legitimate causes of wage differentials and the effects of 
all sources of discrimination, i.e., all the components of [cl in Figure 1 supra. See note 85 
supra and part I B 1 c infra. 
" Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 401. 
" Id. at 401-02. 
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evidence runs strongly counter to Wage Discrimination's thesis 
on all three dimensions of its attempted proof: theory, authority 
and fact. 
1. The logic of economic theory - The immediately preced-
ing section of this article has demonstrated that the economic 
studies which, Wage Discrimination suppose~, reveal wage dis-
crimination actually show no such phenomenon. Instead, the 
economists have demonstrated residual wage differentials, a 
term that includes unmeasured nondiscriminatory factors, the 
effects of job separation, and the results, if any, of wage discrim-
ination. The problem for a wage discrimination theory, however, 
is not just that available data are unsatisfactory, but also that 
the entire idea of wage discrimination is grounded on an eco-
nomic theory, the logic of which precludes an assessment of wage 
discrimination. 
Wage discrimination is a concept that has meaning only with 
respect to the worth of jobs. If a female nurse's work is worth 
seven~eighths as much as that of a male real estate appraiser, 
but is paid only five-eighths as much, it may be argued that 
wage discrimination is occurring. 98 The basic idea of wage dis-
crimination is that wages are disproportionate to the worth of 
work performed. Absent some way of establishing the "worth" of 
jobs, wage discrimination loses all meaning. It must further be 
shown how the worth of work should be measured. 
One could attempt to evaluate the worth of jobs in three im-
portant ways. These may be called (a) market value, (b) job 
evaluation systems, and (c) marginal productivity analysis. 
a. Market value. The market value of a job is the common 
sense meaning: the conjunction of what an employer is willing to 
pay and what a worker is willing to accept. "Worth" in this 
sense may be determined individually, as when an executive ne-
gotiates an employment contract, or collectively, as in bargain-
ing between unions and employers. Market value serves well 
enough for most purposes, and it has the great virtue of determi-
nateness. A job's market value is what is paid. For purposes of 
detecting wage discrimination, however, market value is of no 
use. As Wage Discrimination points out,97 market value includes 
whatever distortions discrimination may cause.98 
" See, e.g., Lemons v. City & County of Denver, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 906 (D. 
Colo. 1978), aff'd, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 81, at D-1 (10th Cir. April 24, 1980). 
" Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 441-43. 
11 It would be possible to assess the "worth" of jobs by a criterion closely related to, 
but distinct from, market value: the opinions of employees as to a fair wage for each job. 
The opinion standard would, of course, be of no use for proving wage discrimination, as it 
would be subject to the same kinds of biases as the market value standard. 
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b. Job evaluation systems. Job evaluation systems attempt 
to assess such factors as skill, effort, responsibility, and working 
conditions, so as to rank the relative worth of jobs.99 But for a 
number of reasons which are ably set forth in Wage Discrimina-
tion, 100 job evaluation systems are inherently too subjective to be 
useful as anchors for the concept of wage discrimination. Job 
evaluation systems are basically methods for systematizing and 
recording subjective judgments, and at each stage in the process 
- job analysis, job description, selection of compensable factors, 
weighting of compensable factors, and the selection of the 
breadth of jobs to which a particular system will be applied -
the necessarily subjective judgments inevitably incorporate indi-
vidual and societal biases. rn• Wage Discrimination is correct in 
However, opinions concerning the fairness of men's and women's wages do have impor-
tant implications for the practicality of the remedies that Wage Discrimination would 
prescribe. An employer, court, or legislature that attempts to impose a pay schedule that 
violates employees' beliefs about fairness of wages will produce low morale, high turn-
over, and loss of productivity. Thurow, Equity Concepts and the World of Work, in MEA-
SURING WORK QUALITY FOR SocIAL REPORTING 207, 207-13 (A. Biderman & T. Drury eds. 
1976). . 
Men's and women's beliefs about the fairness of their pay have been studied. R. CuR-
TIN, INCOME EQUITY AMONG U.S. WORKERS (1977). Curtin's data show widespread satisfac-
tion with the fairness of one's own pay as compared with the pay of others, and the 
proportion of satisfied workers increased between an initial survey in 1973 and a later 
survey in 1975. Id. at 36. When respondents were asked to compare their pay rate with 
that of others in their own occupation, women were more often satisfied with the fairness 
of their pay than were men. When the comparisons were across occupations, e.g., com-
paring a secretary with an electrician, the proportions of women and men who felt that 
they were paid the "amount deserved or more" were very nearly equal: 
The implication of this data is that if Wage Discrimination's proposals were adopted, 
and most women's wages substantially increased, a large proportion of women would be 
paid much more, and a large proportion of men much less, than they believe their jobs 
are worth. If the existence of wage discrimination is not even perceived by most workers, 
male and female alike, it would be a bold employer, court, or Congress that imposed such 
a remedy. 
" NAS REPORT, supra note 10, at 1-7. See also Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 
428-34. 
'"" Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 434-41. 
1• 1 Id. at 435-41. The quest for a purely technocratic method of wage determination-a 
job evaluation system independent of subjective judgments and biases-is futile. Job 
evaluation systems mute individual biases, but a committee's consensus is not objective 
just because several people participated. As prospective yardsticks for assessment of job 
"worth," job evaluation systems· also suffer from the problem that no one system is 
adaptable to all jobs. Even for jobs as similar as those in the steel and aluminum indus-
tries, the job evaluation system developed for one industry was unsuited to the other. 
NAS REPORT, supra note 10, at 6. If jobs in the steel and aluminum industries require 
different job evaluation systems, it would seem unlikely that a single system can serve as 
the measure of "worth" for the entire spectrum of jobs, from abrasive tool operator to 
zymurgist. An additional difficulty that would confront an effort to set wages according 
to a universal job evaluation system is the fact that job evaluation systems have purposes 
and uses other than the setting of wages. See, e.g., Suskin, Job Evaluation-It's More 
Than a Tool For Setting Pay Rates, 31 PUB. PERSONNEL REv. 283 (Oct. 1970). A multi-
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noting that job evaluation systems are inherently too subjective 
to be satisfactory observation points from which bias could be 
detected. 
The EEOC has commissioned a study of job evaluation sys-
tems by the NAS in the hope that a new system, unbiased and 
universally applicable, can be developed.'02 Such a job evalua-
tion system (JES) presumably would be the fulcrum from which 
all types of pay "inequities" could be levered into line. If the 
NAS's interim report103 presages its final conclusions, the EEOC 
will be disappointed. According to the NAS Report, job evalua-
tion systems are problematic and have troublesome features. 10~ 
The best-known JES, the proprietary Hay Associates system, is 
extremely subjective and fails to distinguish well at lower job 
levels. 105 Different JES's can produce quite different evaluations 
of the "worth" of the same job. 106 Even in two basic metal indus-
tries, steel and aluminum, which cover a very small segment of 
the spectrum of all jobs, it has proved impossible to develop a 
single JES suitable to both. 107 And even if a universally accept-
able and fair JES were possible, the unreliability of ratings prob-
ably would preclude its use. 108 All in all, the NAS Report con-
cludes, "the evidence is not particularly encouraging." 109 
purpose system will necessarily be a compromise and not precisely fitted to any single 
purpose. 
102 See text accompanying note 10 supra. The Women's Bureau of the Department of 
Labor also plans to fund research with this objective. Remarks of Alexis Herman, Direc-
tor, Women's Bureau, to Organizing Conference of Coalition of Labor Union Women, 
Washington, D.C. (Jan. 24, 1980), in DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 17, at E-1 (Jan. 24, 
1980). 
103 NAS REPORT, supra note 10. 
104 Id. at xii, 30. 
105 /d. at 22-23. 
108 /d. at 35, 39. 
107 Id. at 6. 
1 .. Id. at 41. Reported reliabilities of job evaluation systems range from about .34 to 
about .95 on the correlation coefficient scale of O to 1. Id. Even when reliability is as high 
as .90, serious misclassification will occur with considerable frequency. For example, if 
jobs were graded on a scale from 1 to 16, and reliability were .90, one of twenty jobs 
whose true grade was 8 would be misgraded into grades 1-4 or grades 12-16. While a 
reliability of .90 is satisfactory for purposes of aggregate statistical analysis, a serious 
misgrading of 5% of jobs obviously would be unacceptable. The NAS REPORT properly 
concludes: "[J)ob evaluation procedures may not be very reliable given the purpose they 
are meant to serve." Id. 
1°' Id. at 40. See also Paterson & Husband, Decision Making Responsibility: Yardstick 
for Job Evaluation, 2 COMPENSATION REv., No. 2, at 21 (1970). This article, cited by Wage 
Discrimination for another purpose, is highly critical of existing job evaluation systems. 
On the failure of job evaluation systems as applied to high-level jobs, see G. WASHINGTON 
& V. ROTHSCHILD, 1 COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE 23 n.75 (3d ed. 1962); 
Mautz & Rock, The Wages of Management, 11 U. FLA. L. REv. 474, 508 (1958). See also 
Patton, What Is an Executive Worth?, 39 HARv. Bus. REv. 65, 72 (March-April 1961). 
WINTER 1980] "Comparable Worth" 257 
c. Marginal productivity analysis. Marginal productivity 
analysis measures the worth of work by the value that the work 
adds to the total output of the enterprise. 11° For example, sup-
pose that widgets are manufactured by first stamping them from 
sheets of widget-stock, then polishing them. A widget stamper 
and a widget polisher each can process 100 widgets per day. If 
widget stock costs 10¢ per widget, and if stamped but unpolished 
widgets are worth 50¢ each, and if polished widgets a·re worth 
$3.00 each, the work of the polisher is worth $250 per day, while 
the work of the stamper is worth only $40 per day.'1 1 This is what 
economists usually mean when they speak of the theoretical or 
"true worth" of jobs. 112 
In spite of the intellectual elegance of marginal productivity 
theory, real-world wages are rarely, if ever, set by reference to 
marginal productivity analysis. 113 One reason is that few enter-
prises are as conveniently compartmentalized as the theoreti-
cian's widget factory. The typist, the security guard, the supervi-
sor, the maintenance mechanic, and the receptionist all perform 
vital functions in modern industry, but economists recognize 
that it would be futile to try to identify the increment in profit 
IIO N. TOLLES, ORIGINS OF MODERN WAGE THEORIES 19-20 (1964). 
111 The example is oversimplified for purposes of illustration, as it does not take capital 
costs into account. If the stamping machine had a fair rental value of $10 per day, and 
the polishing machine rented for $220 per day, the productivity of the labor involved in 
the two jobs would be equal. 
112 Where the schools of economic theory differ is in the size, distribution, and explana-
tion of differences between the "true worth" of jobs as measured by marginal productiv-
ity and the "worth" of those same jobs in the marketplace. See, e.g., N. TOLLES, supra 
note 110, at 8-24. For a more technical explanation of marginal productivity as the theo-
retical measure of job worth, see P. SAMUELSON, EcoNOMICS 541-45 (10th ed. 1976). 
113 See, e.g., A. WooD, A THEORY OF PAY (1978); Belcher, Employee and Executive 
Compensation, in EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS •REsEARCH 73, .77-80 (H. Heneman, Jr., L. 
Brown, M. Chandler, R. Kahn, H. Parnes & G. Shultz eds. 1960) (survey of literature 
shows that important determinants of wages are labor market prices, union pressure, 
labor supply, product market competition, expected profits, employee satisfaction, and 
company prestige; marginal productivity is not mentioned); Foster & Kanin-Lovers, De-
terminants of Organizational Pay Policy, 9 COMPENSATION REv., No. 3, at 35 (1977) (mar-
ginal productivity not mentioned); Woodhead, Are You Using the Right Pay Policy?, 40 
CANADIAN Bus., No. 12, at 40 (1975) (pay determined by several factors, not including 
marginal productivity). The fact that wages are set according to factors other than mar-
ginal productivity analysis does not imply that productivity and wages are unrelated. In 
the long run, but not in the short run, productivity and wages are closely related. 
Belcher, supra, at 76. 
One reason that marginal productivity analysis is not used in setting wages is that the 
necessary data do not exist. L. THUROW, PovERTY AND D1sCRIMINATION 44 (1969). Probably 
the closest approach to pay on the basis of marginal productivity is in the compensation 
of salesworkers on a commission basis. Commissions are only a rough approximation of 
marginal productivity for a number of reasons, one of which is the competitive market in 
sales commissions. Employers must pay the "going rate" of commissions even if it ex-
ceeds the current profit per sale. 
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that each such job adds to the total enterprise. 
Neverthele~s, if wage discrimination were to have a practical 
meaning, the discrimination would be measured by reference to 
marginal productivity. This would apply both in economic the-
ory and in a common sense meaning of "wage discrimination." 
To say that a person is not paid "what the job is worth" often 
means that there is a larger difference than is normal between 
the value of the job to the enterprise, in the marginal productiv-
ity sense, and the wages paid for the job. Hence the job is paid 
less in proportion to its marginal productivity than. are other 
jobs. 
Because the marginal productivity of jobs can almost never be 
measured directly, economists have used the indirect approach 
of multiple regression analysis. 114 If one assumes that everyone is 
employed in a job commensurate with his or her abilities, and if, 
on average, abilities are highly correlated with such measurable 
job qualifications as education and experience, then productivity 
would increase with job qualifications. If equally "qualified" 
groups of men and women, e.g., college graduates, are paid dif-
ferently, discrimination may be the explanation. It is this kind of 
indirect and inferential analysis that is employed in the 
·econometric studies diagrammed in Figure 1 of this article, 115 
and whose results are summarized in Wage Discrimination's Ta-
ble 1.116 
The logic of multiple regression analysis, however, precludes 
direct evidence of wage discrimination. Econometric studies of 
residual wage differentials measure differences after statistical 
adjustments to equate groups for education, experience, and 
other surrogates for the unmeasurable variable, productivity. 
But the residual wage differentials thus identified cannot be sep-
arated into effects of differential job choice, job segregation, and 
wage discrimination ([d], [f] and [g] respectively in Figure 1). 
The reason will be apparent if one considers again the hypotheti-
cal example of the electrical contractor. Suppose the contractor's 
receptionist, a female, earns one-half the salary of the male elec-
trical crafts workers, and suppose she is equal to the average 
electrician in experience, education, and seniority. With no inde-
"' See, e.g., R. TSUCHIGANE & N. DODGE, EcoNOMIC DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN IN 
THE UNITED STATES 29-50 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ECONOMIC D1scR1MINATION); Steven-
son, Relative Wages and Sex Segregation by Occupation, in SEX, DISCRIMINATION, AND THE 
DIVISION OF LABOR, supra note 15, at 175; M. Hamilton, A Study of Wage Discrimination 
by Sex: A Sample Survey in the Chicago Area (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Univ. of 
Pa. 1969). 
11• See text accompanying note 22 supra. 
"' Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 456 n.220. 
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pendent measure of the marginal productivity of jobs, one has no 
evidence to inform a choice among the following possibilities: 
(a) The residual wage differential is entirely due to job 
segregation. That is, the receptionist is fairly paid in rela-
tion to the work that she does, but she has been discrimi-
natorily assigned to a job that is "worth" less, in the mar-
ginal productivity sense, than the jobs reserved for the 
male electricians. 
(b) The same as (a), but the receptionist's job assign-
ment is hers by her choice; the discrimination was in her 
upbringing, not by her employer. 
(c) The residual wage differential is entirely due to wage 
discrimination. That is, the marginal productivity of the 
receptionist's job, if it could be measured, would be equal 
to that of the electrician's; it is because the receptionist's 
job is "women's work" that it is underpaid. 
(d) Any combination of (a), (b), and (c). 
Except in rare instances, 117 all econometric studies of wage dis-
crimination must use the same basic logic and thus must pro-
duce equally inconclusive results. One is forced to the conclusion 
that for purposes of evaluating alleged wage discrimination, none 
of the three theoretical methods.of assessing job "worth" is via-
ble. Market value is relatively precise, but if wage discrimination 
exists, it may be incorporated in market rates. Job evaluation 
systems are highly imprecise and, like market rates, may or may 
not be biased. Marginal productivity cannot be measured at all 
for most jobs, and even if it could, multiple regression analysis 
cannot dissect wage discrimination from other sources of residual 
wage differentials. 
Suggestive but fragmentary evidence on the relative impor-
tance of job separation and/or individual choice, on the one 
hand, and wage discrimination, on the other hand, exists in the 
contrasts among econometric studies that have analyzed wide 
versus narrow ranges of jobs. At one extreme are studies that 
encompass a very wide range of jobs, jobs that obviously vary in 
"worth" by any definition. Such studies invariably find substan-
tial residual wage differentials, and it is a fair inference that 
much of the residual wage differential are the consequence of 
job segregation ([f] in Figure 1) and/or individual choice ([d] in 
117 The rare exceptions are those in which the men and women perform identical work, 
and in which, therefore, their marginal productivity is known to be the same or nearly 
the same. As to these situations, see text at notes 119-22 infra. 
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Figure 1). 118 At the other extreme are studies in which only one 
job { [g'] in Figure 1) or a narrow set of jobs is analyzed, e.g., the 
study of racial differences in pay of baseball players. 119 It is to 
such studies that Wage Discrimination refers when it speaks of 
"controlling for occupational affiliation." 120 When the range of 
jobs is narrowed, Wage Discrimination acknowledges, the result 
is a diminution in "the estimated effects of discrimination." 121 
Thus, Wage Discrimination admits, "[o]ne's choice of variables, 
in fact, can eliminate discrimination completely." 122 The elimi-
nation of statistical suggestions of .discrimination occurs when 
one focuses on the one situation in which effects of job segrega-
tion and individual vocational choice are eliminated, and in 
which, therefore, any discriminatory residual wage differentials 
must be due to wage discrimination. That situation is the com-
parison of men and women doing identical jobs { [g'] in Figure 1). 
Wage Discrimination admits that relatively little discrimination 
occurs in the context of women and men performing equal 
work. 123 
The virtual disappearance of residual wage differentials when 
the effects of job separation are eliminated at first seems strong 
evidence against the existence of substantial wage discrimina-
tion. It is possible, however, that employee resistance to the un-
fairness of unequal pay for identical work discourages wage dis-
crimination when jobs are very similar but not when jobs are 
dissimilar. Nevertheless, what evidence there is against the exis-
tence of substantial wage discrimination is important when con-
trasted with the complete absence of econometric evidence for 
the existence of substantial wage discrimination. 124 
118 See, e.g., ECONOMIC DISCRIMINATION, supra note 114. 
111 See note 57 supra. See also Fuchs, supra note 88, at 9. 
''" Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 455 n.220. 
IZI Id. 
122 Id. at 455; accord, J. MADDEN, supra note 72, at 92. 
•= Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 454 n.218, quoting Kahne & Kohen, supra 
note 81, at 1261. 
,.. In conjunction with the upsurge of feminist activity during the 1970's, economists, 
and especially feminist economists, greatly elaborated and expanded econometric studies 
of sex discrimination. The most recent, and by far the most technically developed, collec-
tion of such studies appeared too late for citation in Wage Discrimination. WOMEN IN THE 
LABOR MARKET, supra note 90. This collection represents the most scientifically advanced 
analysis ever published on the economics of sex discrimination, yet it in no way disturbs 
the conclusions of the present article. The conclusions of one of the chapter authors, 
Chiplin, are typical: "This article has questioned whether the residual [wage differential) 
approach . . . can provide any guidance to the existence or extent of sex discrimination 
. . . . [M]any of us might believe that sex discrimination exists, but do we know?" 
Chiplin, An Evaluation of Sex Discrimination: Some Problems and a Suggested Re-
orientation, in id. at 266-67. 
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2. Lack of authority for Wage Discrimination's thesis -
Before the courts or the Congress would act on the premise that 
jobs done largely by women and blacks are paid less than they 
are "worth," they would likely require near unanimity among 
the experts that the problem at least exists. 
It is not possible to mobilize such a showing of authoritative 
opinion. Part I of Professor Blumrosen's article is a compilation 
of authorities regarding a great many forms of economic and so-
cial discrimination against women and blacks, but not wage dis-
crimination. If one were to read part I hastily, one could come 
away with the impression that wage discrimination is an ac-
cepted concept and a proven fact, for the article cites many 
economists on many facets of labor economics. A close reading, 
however, reveals that none of Professor Blumrosen's authorities 
is claimed to have proven or even to have discussed wage dis-
crimination in the sense that she uses the term. The closest that 
her authorities come to her concept is in the studies of residual 
wage differentials, and that is an idea of very much broader 
scope than wage discrimination. 125 
125 See text accompanying notes 86-92 supra. The principal economic studies cited in 
Wage Discrimination are those by the distinguished liberal economist, John Galbraith, J. 
GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE (1973); the present Secretary of Labor, 
Ray Marshall, supra note 81; a recent Secretary of Commerce, J. KREPS, SEX IN THE 
MARKETPLACE: AMERICAN WOMEN AT WoRK (1971); and the academicians Lloyd, Sawhill, 
Oaxaca, Madden, and Kahne & Kohen. Kahne & Kohen, Economic Perspectives on the 
Role of Women in the American Economy, 13 J. EcoN. LIT. 1249 (1975); Lloyd, The 
Division of Labor Between the Sexes: A Review, in SEX, D1SCRIMINATION, AND THE DIVISION 
OF LABOR, supra note 15, at l; J. MADDEN, supra note 72; Oaxaca, supra note 81; Sawhill, 
supra note 8. Kreps, Floyd, Sawhill, Madden and Kahne are female. The scope of Profes-
sor Blumrosen's authorities is very broad, for four of the works she cites are surveys of the 
entire literature on discrimination against women in the workplace. See the works of 
Marshall, Kreps, Oaxaca, and Kahne & Kohen supra. 
Surprising as it may seem, nowhere in these works does one find even the idea of wage 
discrimination, much less assertions that it exists to a significant degree, or that it exists 
at all. In a search for scholarly opinion and data on wage discrimination, the present 
authors have reviewed a number of authorities not cited by Professor Blumrosen. Such 
opinion and data were notable by their paucity. 
We have located only two works by economists which recognize the possibility of wage 
discrimination. EcoNOMIC DISCRIMINATION, supra note 114; L. TuuROW, supra note 113. 
Writing in the context of race discrimination, Thurow dissects the theoretically conceiva-
ble types of invidious economic discrimination into seven categories, one of which is wage 
discrimination. Although Thurow recognizes wage discrimination as a theoretical possi-
bility, he is hesitant to draw conclusions from his econometric analysis. L. THUROW, 
supra note 113, at 7, 44. As remedies for the seven types of discrimination, in whatever 
proportions they may occur, Thurow proposes a large number of government interven-
tions, but not the direct assault on presumed wage discrimination that Professor Blum-
rosen proposes. He makes a strong case, instead, for changes in government control of the 
economy as a whole, or what are commonly referred to as aggregate economic policies: 
As a practical policy instrument, creating tighter markets presents several ad-
vantages. Aggregate economic policies are impersonal. They can be implemented 
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It is difficult to find discussions of wage discrimination even if 
one moves outside the realm of economics. For example, one 
might expect to find the concept discussed in hearings before the 
EEOC, but in the hearings cited by Wage Discrimination, nearly 
one thousand pages were devoted to job separation, yet wage dis-
crimination was never mentioned. 128 
3. Alternatives to the thesis - No one disputes that residual 
wage differentials occur. The question is what causes these dif-
ferences: wage discrimination, other factors, or both? Professor 
Blumrosen assumes that the role of wage discrimination must be 
large, but this assumption is unwarranted. The importance of al-
ternative explanations has been amply demonstrated. 
a. The factor of job separation. None of the parties to the 
comparable worth controversy argues that all jobs are of equal 
value. None would dispute that managerial jobs are "worth" 
more than production jobs, that craft jobs are "worth" more 
than semiskilled jobs, or that jobs that require extensive special-
ized training and education are "worth" more than those that do 
not. Professor Blumrosen has cited many studies that show be-
yond any doubt that managerial jobs, crafts jobs, and jobs that 
require extensive specialized training and education are jobs per-
formed mainly by men. 127 
To the extent that this job separation is caused by employer 
discrimination against women, remedies already exist in Title 
VII: it is illegal to refuse to hire or promote into high-value jobs 
because of sex. 128 The comparable worth theory and Professor 
without recruiting a bureaucracy of administrators, trainers, teachers and social 
workers. They do not require state and local cooperation. They do not interfere 
with personal choice. They can be quickly implemented; they are cheaply imple-
mented; and they can become effective in a short period time. 
Id. at 64-65. The entire field of the economics of discrimination is in a state of flux and 
scholarly disagreement. See, e.g., Aigner & Cain, Statistical Theories of Discrimination 
in Labor Markets, 30 INDUS. & LAB. REL. R.Ev. 175 (1977). 
111 Hearing Before the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on Discrimi-
nation in White Collar Employment, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). (This volume is cited in 
Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 407 n.40, as the source of a quotation by former 
EEOC Commissioner Hernandez, but the citation appears to be erroneous, as Hernandez 
did not testify at the hearing, nor did she submit remarks for the record.). 
127 Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at nn.3, 9, 10, 11, 17, 21, 26, 28, 29-39, 57, 61, 
62, 65, 84-88, 194, 196, 198, & 215. 
1211 Of course, not all job separation is the result of discrimination by employers. Par-
ents, schools, and our society in general discriminate very strongly, producing among 
women and men quite different ideas as to the vocations they can and should select. This 
phenomenon is called sex role differentiation or sex typing. Fuchs, Women's Earnings: 
Recent Trends and Long-Run Prospects, MONTHLY LAB. REv., May 1979, at 23; J. GAL-
BRAITH, supra note 125, at 37; J. KREPS, supra note 125, at 42-46; E. MACCOBY & ·c. JACK· 
LIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX DIFFERENCES 277-348 (1974); Sawhill, supra note 125, at 391-
94; Stephenson, Relative Wages and Sex Segregation by Occupation, in SEx, D1scR1MtNA-
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Blumrosen's proposed remedies would do nothing to end job sep-
aration. In fact, her proposed pay raises for "women's" jobs 
would tend to perpetuate job separation by eliminating major in-
centives for women to seek non-traditional jobs. 129 
b. The factor of ''iob crowding." Job separation is most likely 
the consequence both of sex role differentiation130 and job segre-
gation. Regardless of the cause, the result is "crowding" of 
women into a restricted spectrum of jobs and a concomitant de-
crease in the market value of their services. 131 Technically, the 
crowding theory proposes that wage differentials occur because 
members of a group are excluded (or exclude themselves) from 
some occupations, hence are "crowded" into others. To the ex-
tent that wages are elastic with respect to the number of appli-
cants, wages are depressed in the crowded occupations. 132 This 
situation can be alleviated by opening .up all jobs to both sexes, 
i.e., by enforcement of Title VII as Congress intended. 133 Court-
mandated pay raises would exacerbate crowding, not alleviate it. 
C. Failure to Demonstrate Wage Discrimination 
Part A of this section showed that the facts and the analysis of 
Professor Blumrosen's article were insufficient to make a case 
that wage discrimination is an important phenomenon. Part B 
TION, AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR, supra note 15, at 175, 197. But see R. KANTER, MEN AND 
WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 260-64 (1977) (sex role differentiation far from complete ex-
planation of job separation). 
'" Pay raises for "women's" jobs would make those jobs more attractive to men as well 
as women, and some integration of "women's" jobs might result. However, the entry of 
men into "women's" jobs would produce no reciprocal incentive for women to seek 
"men's" jobs. 
130 See note 128 supra. 
131 The economist and former Secretary of Commerce Juanita Kreps expressed the con-
sensus of scholars when she wrote: · 
[T)he concentration of women in the accepted female occupations of elementary 
teaching, nursing, clerical and service-type jobs would seem ... to indicate 
some reluctance on the part of women to venture into men's occupational terri-
tory, or some reluctance on the part of employers to offer men and women wider 
job options, probably both. 
J. KREPS, supra note 125, at 36. Professor Kreps further states: 
H women would make economic gains, they need to realize that market forces do 
have an impact, and that they cannot continue to offer an excess supply of a 
particular talent such as elementary school teaching, and yet expect the salary 
for that job to keep pace with that in professions which are understaffed . 
. Id. at 106-07. 
132 Bergmann, The Effect on White Incomes of Discrimination in Employment, 79 J. 
PoL. EcoN. 294 (1971); Johnson & Stafford, Women and the Academic Labor Market, in 
SEX, DISCRIMINATION, AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR, supra note 15, at 201, 212; Stephenson, 
supra note 128, at 175. 
,.. See part II infra. 
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showed that the factual thesis of Wage Discrimination is mis-
taken in its logic and unsupported by expert authority. More-
over, well-established alternative explanations account for much, 
if not all, of the wage differentials that Professor Blumrosen at-
tributes to wage discrimination. Before the law can attempt to 
act on wage discrimination, the phenomenon must be defined, 
demonstrated, and measured with a great deal more precision 
than now seems possible. 
II. TITLE VII AND RESIDUAL w AGE DIFFERENTIALS 
A number of substantial legal problems bar the adoption of 
the job separation-cum-wage discrimination theory outlined by 
Professor Blumrosen. The first of these legal difficulties is the 
fact that the legislative history of the pertinent statutes is incon-
sistent with the interpretation that her article would place on 
them. If the EEOC and the courts adopt the Blumrosen theory, 
a major restructuring of the American economy will likely re-
sult.134 It is implausible that Congress intended such an upheaval 
in wage structures when it enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 and the amendments to Title VII in 1972 without 
134 It is hard to overstate the potential dollar impact of the Blumrosen theory upon the 
American economy. Statistics cited by Professor Blumrosen indicate that the average 
earnings of full-time women workers are less than sixty percent of the average for full-
time working men. Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 410. It is her contention that 
"[f)rom 20% to 50% of the wage differential between men and women has been attributed 
to factors which cannot be justified on grounds unrelated to discrimination." Id. at 497. 
Finally, she states that "most women work in 'women's jobs' " and that a substantial 
number of women work in jobs that are more than seventy percent female-intensive. Id. 
at 405-06. Given this battery of statistics, it is clear that a broad scale application of 
Professor Blumrosen's theory would require a vast sum of money to achieve true pay 
parity across the spectrum of jobs in the American work force covered by Title VII. It was 
estimated in 1978 that "to raise the aggregate pay of the country's 27.3 million full-time 
working women high enough so that the median pay for women would equal that of men 
would add a staggering $150 billion a year to civilian payrolls." Smith, The EEOC's Bold 
Foray Into Job Evaluation, FORTUNE, Sept. 11, 1978, at 58-59. Congress could not have 
intended this cataclysmic impact on the American e_conomy, since it made no reference 
to such a result in the legislative history underlying Title VII. The gravest consequences 
would inexorably flow from such a drastic imposition of liability upon employers: compe-
tition between companies would become dependent largely on pay parity factors extrane-
ous to normal market concerns; American companies would have less ability to compete 
in the international market, with a corresponding increase in the balance of payments 
deficit; collective bargaining relations between employers and unions would become un-
settled if artificial pay levels were imposed for compensation of women in unorganized 
occupations; and the costs of goods and services would undoubtedly increase, thus fur-
ther fueling the inflationary spiral. In short, Professor Blumrosen's theory, like the equal 
value approach rejected in Lemons v. City & County of Denver, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 
906 (D. Colo. 1978), aff'd, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 81, at D-1 (10th Cir. April 
24, 1980), is "pregnant with the possibility of disrupting the entire economic system of 
the United States of America." Id. at 907. 
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any substantial legislative debate on that subject. This implausi-
bility is magnified when one considers that the EPA, a statute 
specifically addressed to remedying sex-based wage discrimina-
tion, is based in great part upon a legislative history that sharply 
limits federal intrusion into wage structures. The argument that 
Title VII may be invoked to equalize wage differentials is further 
attenuated by the Bennett Amendment, 135 a statutory provision 
which ties Title VII sex-based compensation claims to the "equal 
work" standard of the EPA. 
A. Congressional Intent and the "Equal Work" Standard 
I. The EPA - It is important to recall that both the EPA 
and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, of which Title VII is a part, 
were passed by consecutive sessions of the Eighty-eighth Con-
gress. In every Congress since 1945, bills had been introduced 
regarding pay parity for women. 138 The Eighty-eighth Congress 
drew upon this background and took great pains to delineate the 
standard under which sex-based compensation claims would be 
examined under the EPA. Congress concluded that governmen-
tal intervention to equalize wage differentials was to be under-
taken only within one set of circumstances: when men's and 
women's jobs were identical or nearly so, hence unarguably of 
equal worth. In order to sustain the Blumrosen theory, one must 
believe that the same legislators who had so carefully 
circumscribed legal intervention into compensation practices 
under the EPA threw those restrictions to the winds one year later, 
during the passage of Title VII, without any significant debate. 
The legislative history of ·the EPA demonstrates the caution 
that Congress expressed in adopting a wage discrimination stan-
dard. The debates showed overriding Congressional concern that 
the EPA not be invoked by the government to mandate equality 
of pay for jobs of different content and, concomitantly, a concern 
that the latitude of administrators and courts in enforcing the 
EPA be clearly circumscribed by the equal work wage discrimi-
nation standard. 137 "What we seek to ensure," Representative 
Frelinghuysen explained, is "where men and women are doing 
the same job under the same working conditions that they will 
'" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). 
131 See e.g., Gitt & Gelb, Beyond the Equal Pay Act: Expanding Wage Differential 
Protections Under Title VII, 8 Lov. U.L.J. (Chicago) 723, 734-42 (1977). 
137 108 CONG. REc. 14747 (1962) (remarks of Rep. St. George); id. at 14768 (1962) (re-
marks of Rep. Landrum). 
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receive the same pay." 138 He continued: 
[T]he jobs in dispute must be the same in work content, 
effort, skill, and responsibility requirements, and in work-
ing conditions. . . . [The EPA] is not intended to com-
pare unrelated jobs; or jobs that have been historically 
and normally considered by the industry to be different. 
Violations usually will be apparent, and will almost al-
ways, occur in the same work area and where the same 
tasks are performed. 139 
Representative Goodell, who sponsored the bill that became 
the EPA, echoed Representative Frelinghuysen's comments. He 
noted that the bill as originally introduced had used the term 
"comparable work" rather than "equal work." 140 The former 
term, as Professor Blumrosen points out, 141 had a well-estab-
lished connotation. During World War II, the regulations of the 
National War Labor Board (NWLB) required equal pay for 
"comparable work." Under these regulations, the Board had 
made job evaluations to determine whether pay inequities ex-
isted within a plant between dissimilar jobs.142 In substituting 
the term "equal work" for "comparable work," Congress re-
jected the approach taken by the NWLB. Representative 
Goodell stressed the significance of adopting an "equal work" 
standard: 
I think it is important that we have clear legislative his-
tory at this point. Last year when the House changed the 
word "comparable" to "equal" the clear intention was to 
narrow the whole concept. We went from "comparable" 
to "equal" meaning that the jobs involved should be vir-
tually identical, that is, they would be very much alike or 
closely related to each other. 
We do not expect the Labor Department to go into an 
establishment and attempt to rate jobs that are not 
'"' 109 CONG. REC. 9196 (1963) (remarks of Rep. Frelinghuysen) (emphasis supplied). 
, .. Id. 
"" 109 CoNG. REc. 9197 (1963). 
"' Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 475. 
"' See Angelo v. Bacharach Instrument Co., 555 F.2d 1164 (3d Cir. 19771; Shultz v. 
Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970). 
It should be noted that the NWLB was not a judicial tribunal in any sense. It was a 
tripartite body made up of public, industry, and labor representatives which had the 
authority to resolve disputes only by mediation or arbitration. Its recommendations did 
not have the force and effect of law, nor were they enforceable by court order. See Na-
tional War Labor Board, Termination Report, Vol. I, pp. XXV-XXVI, 7, 10 (1945). 
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equal. We do not want to hear the Department say, 
"Well, they amount to the same thing," and evaluate 
them so they come up to the same skill or point. We ex-
pect this to apply only to jobs that are substantially iden-
tical or equal. 143 
Representative Goodell emphasized that the prime reason Con-
gress had adopted the equal work standard in the EPA was to 
insure that employers would "have a maximum degree of discre-
tion" in working out how much employees should be paid. 14' Pro-
fessor Blumrosen's article glosses over the legislative history of 
the EPA, though it does note that the assumption "that Con-
gress carefully drafted the EPA so that it would apply only to a 
narrow set of circumstances" has "considerable validity." 145 
2. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 - The care with 
which Congress limited intervention into alleged wage discrimi-
nation based upon sex in the EPA contrasts sharply with its cur-
sory treatment of the entire subject of sex discrimination during 
the passage of Title VTI. In fact, the legislative history of the sex 
· discrimination provision of Title VTI is almost nonexistent. 148 
The House bill147 that was ultimately enacted as the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 was intended primarily to secure the rights of 
blacks. The bill went to the House floor for debate without any 
consideration of a sex discrimination prohibition. 148 Debate on 
the House floor lasted almost two weeks, from January 31, to 
"' 109 CONG. REC. 9197 (1963) (remarks of Rep. Goodell). Representative Goodell's re-
marks as a sponsor of the legislation are entitled to great weight. See NLRB v. National 
Woodwork Mfr's Ass'n, 386 U.S. 612, 629-31 (1967). 
A dialogue between Representative Goodell and Representative Griffin further ex-
plained the concept of equal job content: · 
Mr. GOODELL: We are talking about jobs that involve the same quality, the 
same size, the same number, where they do the same type of thing, with an 
identity to them. 
Mr. GRIFFIN: In addition, it would be clear that in comparing inspectors, if 
one inspects a complicated part of an engine, for example, while another inspec-
tor makes only a cursory type of inspection, obviously, the fact that both are 
inspectors would not mean they should necessarily receive equal pay. 
Mr. GOODELL: I agree with the gentleman. 
109 CONG. REc. at 9198. 
'" Id. (remarks of Rep. Goodell). 
"
5 Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 475. 
"' The legislative history of Title VII's sex discrimination provision is "notable prima-
. rily for its brevity." General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 (1976). See also Wage 
Discrimination, supra note 1, at 477-81. 
"
1 H.R. REP. No. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). 
"" Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law Ill: Title VII of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 HAST. L.J. 305, 310 (1968); Miller, 
Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 MINN. L. REv. 877, 
880 (1967). 
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February 10, 1964. It was not until the final day that an amend-
ment to prohibit sex discrimination was proposed as an attempt 
to thwart passage of the bill. 149 The amendment was passed by 
the House that same day, and the entire bill was approved two 
days later and sent to the Senate without any consideration of 
the effect of the amendment on the EPA. 
The bill bypassed the Senate committee system and was 
presented to the full Senate for initial consideration. It was not 
until this time that concern was expressed about the relation of 
the Title VII sex discrimination ban to the EPA. In response, 
Senator Clark submitted a statement to the Senate which as-
sured that" [t]he standards in the Equal Pay Act for determining 
discrimination as to wages, of course, are applicable to the 
comparable situation under title VIl."150 Apparently not com-
pletely satisfied with this explanaton, Senator Bennett proposed 
an amendment to section 703(h). The proffered amendment was 
passed with very little debate, but Senator Bennett clearly stated 
that "[t]he purpose of my amendment is to provide that in the 
event of conflicts, the provisions of the Equal Pay Act shall not be 
nullified. " 151 
During consideration by the House of the Senate amendments 
to the House hill, Congressman Celler was called upon to explain 
the purpose of the Bennett Amendment. He stated that the Ben-
nett Amendment "provides that compliance with the Fair Labor 
Standards Act as amended [i.e., the EPA] satisfies the require-
ments of the title [Title VII] banning discrimination because of 
sex."t52 
The rather barren legislative history of the sex discrimination 
provisions of Title VII evidences no intent by Congress to aban-
don the meticulously crafted, thoroughly debated limitations of 
the EPA, adopted by the same Congress one year earlier. To the 
contrary, the legislative history of the Bennett Amendment 
shows Congressional reluctance to extend governmental regula-
tion of wage differentials beyond the equal work standard of the 
'" Representative Howard Smith of Virginia, Chairman of the House Rules Committee 
and a powerful opponent of Title VIl and of all civil rights legislation, proposed the 
amendment. For a discussion of Judge Smith's motives in proposing to amend Section 
703(a) to prohibit sex discrimination, see Miller, supra note 148, at 880; Kanowitz, supra 
note 148, at 310-13; Note, Employer Dress and Appearance Codes and Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 46 So. CAL. L. REv. 965, 968 (1973). 
150 110 CoNG. REc. 7217 (1964). For further discussion of Senator Clark's memorandum, 
see text accompanying note 162 infra. 
1• 1 110 CoNG. REc. 13647 (1964). 
••z Id. at 15896 (1964). 
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EPA. 153 Thus, Professor Blumrosen's assertion that Title VII's 
prohibition of job segregation affects wage differentials between 
different jobs finds no support in the legislative history of Title 
VII. 
Moreover, Professor Blumrosen's comparable worth theory ig-
nores one of the fundamental policies of the EPA, often ex-
pressed in the legislative history of that statute, that federal in-
tervention in wage setting must not extend beyond equal work 
situations. It should be added that a policy of limited govern-
mental intrusion was operative in the enactment of Title VIl as 
well, as was recently expressed by the Supreme Court in United 
Steelworkers of America v. Weber: 154 "Title VIl could not have 
153 The complete history of the Bennett Amendment is set forth below: 
Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I yield myself 2 minutes ... 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated. 
The legislative clerk read as follows: 
On page 44, line 15, immediately after the period, it is proposed to insert the 
following new sentence: "It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under 
this title for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining 
the amount of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such 
employer if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of section 6(d) of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended (29 U.S.C. 206(d))." 
Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, after many years of yearning by members of 
the fair sex in this country, and after very careful study by the appropriate com-
mittees of Congress, last year Congress passed the so-called Equal Pay Act, 
which became effective only yesterday. 
By this time, programs have been established for the effective administration 
of this act. Now, when the civil rights bill is under consideration, in which the 
word 'sex' has been inserted in many places, I do not believe sufficient attention 
may have been paid to possible conflicts between the wholesale insertion of the 
word 'sex' in the bill and in the Equal Pay Act. 
The purpose of my amendment is to provide that in the event of conflicts, the 
provisions of the Equal Pay Act shall not be nullified. 
I understand that the leadership in charge of the bill have agreed to the 
amendment as a proper technical correction of the bill. H they will confirm that 
understand [sic), I shall ask that the amendment be voted on without asking for 
the yeas and nays. 
Mr. HUMPHREY. The amendment of the Senator from Utah is helpful. I be-
lieve it is needed. I thank him for his thoughtfulness. The amendment is fully 
acceptable. 
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute. 
We were aware of the conflict that might develop, because the Equal Pay Act 
was an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Fair Labor Standards 
Act carries out certain exceptions. 
All that the pending amendment does is recognize those exceptions, that are 
carried in the basic act. 
Therefore, this amendment is necessary, in the interest of clarification. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. (Mr. RIBICOFF in the chair). The question is on 
agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Utah. (Putting the question.) 
The amendment was agreed to. 
Id. at 13647. 
,.. - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. 2721 (1979). 
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been enacted into law without substantial support from legisla-
tors in both Houses who traditionally resisted federal regulation 
of private business. Those legislators demanded as a price for 
their support that "management prerogatives and union free-
doms ... be left undisturbed to the greatest extent possible."155 
This policy of restricted federal intervention into the wage prac-
tices of employers would be eviscerated by the remedial ap-
proach proposed in Wage Discrimination. Virtually all employers 
and workers, and their families, would experience changes in 
their" real incomes if the Wage Discrimination theory became the 
law. 
Even if Title VII were susceptible to a broader interpretation· 
than the EPA as regards sex-linked wage discrimination, the ear-
lier statute should still control. Because the EPA is a specific law 
regulating a particular area of congressional concern, sex-based 
wage discrimination, it must prevail over a later statute, Title 
VII, of general application to the same subject area. 158 Under this 
well-established rule of statutory construction, and in view of the 
legislative record of the two statutes dealing with sex dicriinina-
tion passed by the Eighty-eighth Congress, federal efforts to re-
view wage discrimination claims, by whatever theoretical under-
pinnings, are governed by the EPA. This conclusion is further 
supported by the statutory provision through which Congress 
linked Title VII to the EPA, the Bennett Amendment. 
B. The Blumrosen Theory and the Bennett Amendment 
1. The Bennett Amendment - The Bennett Amendment to 
Title VII states that it is not illegal for an employer to differenti-
ate in compensation on the basis of sex "if such differentiation is 
authorized by the provisions of the [EPA]."157 Professor Blum-
155 Id. at 2730 (citation omitted). For the pertinent legislative history, see H.R. REP. 
No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 29 (1963). 
151 See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), where the Court held that Title 
VII's race discrimination provision did not preclude enforcement of an earlier statute 
giving hiring preference to Indians and stated: "Where there is no clear intention other-
wise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of 
the priority of enactment." Id. at 550-51. Accord, Radzanower v. Touche-Ross & Co., 426 
U.S. 148, 153 (1976) ("It is a basic principle of statutory construction that a statute deal-
ing with a narrow, precise and specific subject is not submerged by a later enacted stat-
ute covering a more generalized spectrum."); Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 
820, 834 (1976) ("[A) precisely drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more general 
remedies."). 
157 The Bennett Amendment provides: 
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any 
employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of 
wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such 
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rosen concludes that the Bennett Amendment incorporates only 
the EPA's four affirmative defenses 158 into Title VII but does not 
also impose the EPA's "equal work" standard upon Title VII as 
the sole basis for sex-based compensation claims. In reaching 
this conclusion, she overlooks both the language of Section 
703(h) and significant legislative history of Title VII and the 
EPA, and she misapprehends relevant court decisions. 
2. The effect of section 703(h) on the purpose of the Bennett 
Amendment - The EPA contains four statutory exceptions or 
defenses. But Title VII's section 703(h), which the Supreme 
Court has recognized as a "definitional provision,"159 already 
contained those defenses when Senator Bennett offered his 
"technical correction."180 The opening sentence of section 703(h) 
protected differentials in compensation based on seniority, 
merit, or quantity or quality of production. These were three of 
the four EPA defenses. The fourth EPA defense, "a factor other 
than sex," was already implicit in Title VII because the statute's 
prohibition of sex discrimination applies only if there is discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex. Thus, Professor Blumrosen's assertion 
that the purpose of the Bennett Amendment was to incorporate 
the EPA defenses is unpersuasive. The four defenses were al-
ready available under Title VII when Senator Bennett proposed 
his amendment. Under such an interpretation the amendment 
would be mere surplusage. 
3. Applicability of the EPA standard to sex-based wage 
claims under Title VII - Wage Discrimination's discussion of 
the Bennett Amendment is sparse and selective, especially in its 
use of legislative history surrounding that provision. The article 
differentiation is authorized by the provisions of Section 206(d) of Title 29 [Fair 
Labor Standards Act of 1938 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)). 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976) (emphasis added). 
151 The Equal Pay Act's four affirmative defenses permit different compensation if the 
differential is made by way of (a) a seniority system, (b) a merit system, (c} a system 
which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production, or (d) a differential based 
on any other factor than sex. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(l) (1976). 
••• See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 82 (1977); Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 346-47 (1977); Franks v. Bow-
man Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 758 (1976). 
1'° The first clause of § 703(h) states: 
(h) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of 
compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursu-
ant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earn-
ings by quantity or quality of production or to employees who work in different 
locations, provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to 
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976) (emphasis added). 
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also overlooks other legislative statements, made during consid-
eration of Title VII, which recognized the potential conflict be-
tween Title VII and the EPA and which resolved that conflict in 
favor of the EPA's standards. 
a. Senator Bennett's written interpretation. In the 1965 con-
gressional session following passage of the Civil Rights Act, Sen-
ator Bennett read into the Congressional Record his interpreta-
tion of the amendment to section 703(h) that he had sponsored 
the previous year.'81 The Senator expressed his concern because a 
law review article had asserted, as does Professor Blumrosen, 
that there were two possible interpretations of the amendment. 182 
Senator Bennett noted that the article suggested the possibility 
that the amendment merely incorporated into Title VII the 
EPA's affirmative defenses, and stated that: "[The language set-
ting out the defenses] is merely clarifying language similar to 
that which was already in section 703(h). If the Bennett Amend-
ment was simply intended to incorporate by reference these ex-
ceptions into subsection (h), the amendment would have no sub-
stantive effect." 183 
The author of the law review article had noted the "more 
plausible" interpretation to be that, if the amendment is to be 
given any effect, "it must be interpreted to mean that discrimi-
nation in compensation on account of sex does not violate Title 
VII unless it also violates the Equal Pay Act. " 184 In order to re-
solve the matter, Senator Bennett offered his written 
interpretation: 
The amendment therefore means that it is not an unlaw-
ful employment practice: ... (b) to have different stan-
dards of compensation for nonexempt employees, where 
such differentiation is not prohibited by the equal pay 
amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act. 
Simply stated, the [Bennett] amendment means that 
discrimination in compensation on account of sex does 
not violate title VII unless it also violates the Equal Pay 
Act.1ss 
111 111 CoNG. REc. 13359-13360 (1965). 
112 Indeed, Professor Blumrosen posits three possible interpretations of the Bennett 
Amendment. Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 481-82. The law review article re-
ferred to in 111 CONG. REC. 13359 (1965) is Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOKLYN L. REV. 62 (1964). 
11• 111 CoNG. REc. 13359 (1965). 
"' Id. 
,.. Id. (emphasis added). Senator Dirksen agreed that this interpretation was the one 
that he, Senator Humphrey, and their staffs had in mind when the Senate adopted the 
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b. The Clark memorandum. Following House passage of the 
bill which became the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including the· sex 
discrimination provision, and after the bill had been debated for 
three weeks in the Senate, Senator Clark, one of the bill's floor 
managers, prepared a memorandum which was read into the 
Congressional Record to answer questions and respond to objec-
tions that had been raised concerning the meaning of Title VII. 
One of these explanations, memorializing a colloquy between 
Senators Dirksen and Clark, clearly states that Congress in-
tended to preserve EPA standards under the Civil Rights bill: 
Objection: The sex antidiscrimination provisions of the 
bill duplicate the coverage of the Equal Pay Act of 1963. 
But more than this, they extend far beyond the scope and 
coverage of the Equal Pay Act. They do not include the 
limitations in that act with respect to equal work on jobs 
requiring equal skills in the same establishments, and 
thus, cut across different jobs. 
Answer: The Equal Pay Act is a part of the wage hour 
law, with different coverage and with numerous exemp-
tions unlike title VII. Furthermore, under Title VII, jobs 
can no longer be classified as to sex, except where there is 
a rational basis for discrimination on the ground of bona 
fide occupational qualification. The standards in the 
Equal Pay Act for determining discrimination as to 
wages, of course, are applicable to the comparable situa-
tion under Title Vll. 166 
Professor Blumrosen cites this passage of the Clark memoran-
dum as evidence that Congress recognized that the EPA does not 
cover most single-sex jobs. 187 As far as it goes, one cannot quarrel 
with her deduction. Clearly, however, the memorandum also 
demonstrates a congressional intent to treat job segregation and 
wage discrimination as separate problems. With respect to Title 
VII's proscription of "discrimination as to wages," Congress in-
tended that Title VII not go beyond the limits of the EPA. More-
over, Senator Clark's explanation cannot be restricted, as Profes-
sor Blumrosen has argued, to mean that the EPA equal work 
standard would apply to Title VII only when conduct that would 
violate the EPA also was alleged to violate Title VII. The Clark 
Bennett Amendment. Id. at 13360 (1965). He added: "I trust that that will suffice to 
clear up in the minds of anyone, whether in the Department of Justice or elsewhere, what 
the Senate intended when that amendment was accepted." Id. 
'" 110 CONG. REc. 7217 (1964) (emphasis added). 
117 Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 478. 
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memorandum plainly expressed the concern that Title VII might 
be construed as prohibiting unequal pay when different jobs were 
involved. Senator Clark's reply indicates that when different jobs 
were at issue, the EPA's legal standards would apply to limit the 
reach of Title Vil. This limitation would be rendered meaning-
less if the Wage Discrimination theory were adopted and a prima 
facie case of wage discrimination could be made out on the mere 
showing that a plaintiff occupied a job traditionally held by 
women. 
c. · The Celler statement. After the Senate added amend-
ments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including the Bennett 
Amendment, it returned the bill to the House. Wage Discrimina-
tion fails to note that during these House deliberations, Repre-
sentative Celler, the bill's original sponsor and floor leader in the 
House, set out in the record the understanding of the House that 
sex-based compensation claims would not satisfy Title Vil unless 
they met the EPA's standards. He stated that the Bennett 
Amendment: "[p]rovides that compliance with the EPA satisfies 
the requirement of the title barring discrimination because of sex 
- Section [703(h)]. " 188 Representative Celler's statement that 
compliance with the EPA satisfies the requirements of Title VII 
recognized, as have the courts, 189 that differences in compensa-
tion that do not violate the EPA are "authorized" by the Ben-
nett Amendment for purposes of Title VII. 
d. The contemporaneous administrative interpretation. Con-
sistent with Representative Celler's and Senator Bennett's inter-
pretation of section 703(h), and Senator Clark's explanation of 
the intended interaction between Title VII and the EPA in the 
area of sex-linked wage discrimination, is the EEOC'.s contempo-
raneous interpretation of the amendment, published in 1965. 
The Commission stated at that time that: 
(a) Title Vil requires that its provisions be harmonized 
with the Equal Pay Act . . . in order to avoid conflicting 
interpretations or requirements with respect to situations 
to which both statutes are applicable. Accordingly, the 
Commission interprets Section 703(h) to mean that the 
standards of "equal pay for equal work" set forth in the 
Equal Pay Act for determining what is unlawful discrimi-
nation in compensation are applicable to Title VII. 170 
"' 110 CONG. REC. 15896 (1964) (emphasis added). 
'" See text accompanying notes 175-77 infra. 
170 29 C.F.R. § 1604.7 (1965) (emphasis added). 
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Although the 1965 EEOC interpretation of the impact of the 
Bennett Amendment was dropped in 1972, when the agency is-
sued a new interpretation that the Bennett Amendment's pur-
pose was only to incorporate the EPA's defenses in Title VII 
wage suits, 171 the Supreme Court has stated on several occasions 
that EEOC interpretations and guidelines which were promul-
gated contemporaneously with the enactment of Title VII should 
be accorded more weight than those issued in later years. 172 
Thus congressional history, even as interpreted by the EEOC 
in 1965, provides no support for the theory asserted in Wage Dis-
crimination that the federal courts can be thrust into a massive 
reorganization of the American economy. Among Congress' rea-
sons for adopting the "equal work" concept, in both Title VII 
and the EPA, were that it was less vague than the "comparable 
work" approach and that it would not inject federal regulators 
and the courts into these areas. 173 
4. The case law - Nearly every court that has addressed the 
issue has held that Title Vll wage discrimination claims are co-
terminous with EPA claims. The "equal work" standard has 
been followed, as a limitation upon wage discrimination claims 
under Title VII, by the Supreme Court174 and by seven federal 
171 In 1972, the EEOC changed its interpretation to eliminate the language of the 1965 
interpretation and substitute the following: 
(a) The employee coverage of the prohibitions against discrimination based 
on sex contained in title VIl is co-extensive with that of the other prohibitions 
contained in title VII and is not limited by section 703(hl to those employees 
covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act. 
(b) By virtue of section 703(h), a defense based on the Equal Pay Act may be 
raised in a proceeding under title Vil. 
(c) Where such a defense is raised the Commission will give appropriate con-
sideration to the interpretations of the Administrator, Wage and Hour Division, 
Department of Labor, but will not be bound thereby. 
29 C.F.R. § 1604.8 (1979) (emphasis added). 
171 See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 76 n.11 (1977); General 
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142-45 (1976). It is likely that the courts will continue 
to give little weight to the 1972 EEOC guideline in wage comparability cases. As the 
Court noted in Trans World Airlines, Inc., "(A)n EEOC guideline is not entitled to great 
weight where . . . it varies from prior EEOC policy and no new legislative history has 
been introduced in support of the change." 432 U.S. at 76 n.11. 
"' See text accompanying notes 142-43 supra. 
"' General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). In Gilbert the Court held that an 
employer's exclusion of benefits for disability during pregnancy was not a violation of 
Title VII. One of the Court's grounds for its decision was a recognition that conduct that 
would otherwise violate § 703(a) of Title VIl was protected by the Bennett Amendment 
because the conduct did not violate the EPA's prohibitions. Id. at 144-45. 
The 1978 pregnancy disability amendment to Title VII amended § 701(kl, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2(k), to state that discrimination because of sex would include the failure to pay 
female employees maternity-related disability payments. Significantly, the amendment 
also provided that "nothing in section 703(h) of this title shall be interpreted to permit 
otherwise." As the House report stated: 
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courts of appeals, 175 as well as by numerous trial courts. 178 These 
This disclaimer was necessitated ·by the Supreme Court's reliance in the Gil-
bert case on Section 703(h) of Title VII ("the Bennett Amendment") which in 
effect provides that certain practices authorized by the [EPA) do not violate Ti-
tle VII. The Court in Gilbert noted that a regulation issued under the Equal Pay 
Act [by the Wage and Hour Administration] provides that certain gender-based 
. differentiations do not violate the [EPA) .... While the Gilbert opinion is 
somewhat vague as to the pertinence of this regulation, it does appear that the 
Court regarded the Bennett amendment and the Equal Pay Act regulat~on, 
taken together, as somehow insulating pregnancy-based classifications from the 
proscriptions of Title VII. 
Therefore, the committee determined that it was necessary to expressly re-
move the Bennett amendment from the pregnancy issue in order to assure the 
equal treatment of pregnant workers. 
H.R. REP. No. 95-948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1978), reprinted in [1978) U.S. CooE CoNG. 
& AoMIN. NEWS 4749, 4755. 
175 Lemons v. City & County of Denver, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 81, at D-1 (10th 
Cir. April 24, 1980); Marshall v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 
143 (5th Cir. 1979); DiSalvo v. Chamber of Commerce, 568 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1978); Laffey 
v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 
0978); Calage v. University of Tennessee, 544 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1976); Keyes v. Lenoir 
Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977); Orr v. Frank 
R. McNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 856 (1975); Ammons 
v. Zia Co., 448 F.2d 117 (10th Cir. 1971); Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d 
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970). 
But see Gunther v. County ofWashington, 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979). Although 
plaintiffs in Gunther were allowed to proceed under a Title VII wage discrimination the-
ory, the court stated that absent a showing of "equal work" the burden of proof still 
remained on the plaintiffs to show on remand that "some of the discrepancy in _wages was 
due to sex discrimination." Id. at 888. 
Cases such as Los Angeles Dep't of Power & Water v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), 
and Laffey v. Northwest Air Lines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 1086 (1978), relied upon by Professor Blumrosen to support the position that the 
Bennett Amendment is not a barrier to a broad application of Title VII to remedy 
residual wage differentials, are inapposite. In Manhart, the Supreme Court was con-
cerned only with defining the "factor other than sex" defense of the EPA. In that case, 
male and female employees were "identically situated," Manhart v. Los Angeles Dep't of 
Power & Water, 553 F.2d 581, 583 (9th Cir. 1976), so the Supreme Court was not con-
fronted with the issue that Professor Blumrosen raises, viz., whether a Title VII wage 
discrimination claim is broader than the EPA. Similarly, in Laffey the actual jobs being 
compared were substantially equal (stewardesses and pursers). The Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia emphasized that Title VII was not intended to supplant the 
EPA in cases involving sex-based wage discrimination claims, stating: 
Although Title VII reaches farther than the Equal Pay Act to protect groups 
other than those sex-based classes and to proscribe discrimination in many facets 
of employment additional to compensation, nowhere have we encountered an in-
dication that Title VII was intended either to supplant or be supplanted by the 
Equal Pay Act in the relatively small area in which the two are congruent. On 
the contrary, we are satisfied that the provisions of both acts should be read in 
pari materia, and neither should be interpreted in a manner that would under-
mine the other. In Orr u. Frank R. McNeil! & Son, Inc., the Fifth Circuit de-
clared that "[t)he sex discrimination provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 must be construed in harmony with the Equal Pay Act of 1963." We 
agree, and we now so hold. 
567 F.2d at 445-46 (footnote omitted). 
"' EEOC v. Ball Corp., Case No. C76-31 (N.D. Ohio 1979); Marshall v. A&M Consoli-
dated School Dist., 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 134 (S.D. Tex. 1979); Johnson v. University 
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courts have ruled that Title VII and the EPA must be construed 
in pari materia. Although Congress limited the scope of sex-
based compensation claims in the EPA, it guaranteed women 
equal access to jobs in Title VII by forbidding discrimination in 
hiring, job placement or classification, promotions, transfers, 
layoffs, and discharges. 177 The two statutes provide a balanced 
approach to sex discrimination, setting forth a scheme that guar-
antees qualified female employees access to all jobs while, at the 
same time, assuring that the courts and federal agencies will not 
become entangled in setting wage rates. 
The theory that Title VII overrides the EPA would entangle 
the courts in a hopeless morass of wage claim litigation. The ju-
dicial entanglement would be exacerbated by the fact that labor 
law has left the substance of collective bargaining to the parties 
and not the government, 178 and so the courts have had little ex-
perience in setting wage rates. It should also be noted that al-
of Bridgeport, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1766, 1769-70 (D. Conn. 1979); JUE v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 450 (D.N.J. 1979), appeal pending, Nos. 79-
1893 & 1894 (3d Cir.); Kohne v. Imco Container Co., 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. 'II 30,168 (W.D. 
Va. 1979); Lemons v. City & County of Denver, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 906 (D. Colo. 
1978), aff'd, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 81, at D-1 (10th Cir. April 24, 1980); Wetzel 
v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 449 F. Supp. 397, 407 (W.D. Pa. 1978); JUE v. Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 16 (N.D. W. Va. 1977); Molthan v. Temple Univ., 420 
F. Supp. 448 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 795 
(N.D. Ind. 1977); Patterson v. Western Development Labs, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 772, 
775-76 (N.D. Cal. 1976). 
177 The general policy considerations for regarding the EPA and Title VII in pari 
materia are cogently summarized by the court in Kohne v. Imco Container Co., 20 Empl. 
Prac. Dec. 'II 30,168 (W.D. Va. 1979), as follows: 
Of course, sound policy underlies such a construction. Congress did not intend to 
put either the Secretary of Labor or the courts in the business of evaluating jobs 
and in determining what constitutes a proper differential for unequal work . . . . 
Sufficient remedies exist under Title VII to deal with discriminatory hiring and 
promotional practices, without the courts becoming embroiled in determinations 
of how an employer's work force ought to be paid. 
Id. at 11,876 (citations omitted). 
"" See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (19701. In Porter, the Court held that the 
National Labor Relations Board had exceeded its remedial powers by ordering the em-
ployer to grant to the union a contract clause providing for checkoff of union dues. The 
Court stated: 
The Board's remedial powers under§ 10 of the Act [29 U.S.C. § 160) are broad, 
but they are limited to carrying out the policies of the Act itself. One of these 
fundamental policies is freedom of contract. While the parties' freedom of con-
tract is not absolute under the Act, allowing the Board to compel agreement 
when the parties themselves are unable to agree would violate the fundamental 
premise on which the Act is based - private bargaining under governmental 
supervision of the procedure alone, without any official compulsion over the ac-
tual terms of the contract. 
Id. at 108 (emphasis added). Under the Wage Discrimination theory, the government 
would seek judicially mandated wage rates for most female workers in the economy, a 
momentous step from "governmental supervision of procedure alone" amounting to "offi-
cial compulsion" of substantive contractual provisions. 
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though Congress adopted the "equal work" approach in the EPA 
because it was narrower and less vague than other alternatives, 
"the federal courts have had no small difficulty" in attempting 
to apply even this standard.179 The adoption of the Wage Dis-
crimination theory would make the federal courts' responsibility 
even more extensive and place upon the judicial system a signifi-
cant burden not intended by Congress. In the words of Mr. Jus-
tice Rehnquist, in the recent case of Furnco Construction Corp. 
v. Waters:' 80 "Courts are generally less competent than employ-
ers to restructure business practices, and unless mandated to do 
so by Congress they should not attempt it." 
III. THE Wage Discrimination THEORY AND STANDARDS OF 
PROOF 
With respect to standards of proof, Professor Blumrosen's the-
ory contains two fatal defects. The first defect is in the creation 
and the operation of the theory's "triggering mechanism," a pre-
sumption of wage discrimination which is established merely by 
showing that a plaintiff works in a job traditionally performed by 
women. The second defect is that the proposed method of proof 
contravenes the established methods of proof under Title VII as 
to the construction of a prima facie case and as to the available 
defenses. 
A. An Examination of the Wage Discrimination Presumption 
All proponents of the comparable worth movement agree that 
the law ought to prohibit wage discrimination. Professor Blum-
rosen goes beyond others in her unique proposal for the method 
of proof. She implicitly recognizes the difficulty - or impossibil-
ity - of demonstrating wage discrimination in any particular in-
stance. To enable the plaintiffs to recover, she proposes that they 
, not be required to prove wage discrimination. She argues that 
the plaintiffs need only show that they work in a job that is or 
was predominantly female. In such jobs wage discrimination is 
so nearly universal, Professor Blumrosen believes, that the law 
should draw the inference of wage discrimination from the bare 
fact of female predominance. 
1. The presumption would be irrebuttable - The key to Pro-
fessor Blumrosen's establishment of a prima facie case of wage 
discrimination is an "inference" - that is, a presumption - of 
171 Angelo v. Bacharach Instrument Co., 555 F.2d 1164, 1170 (3d Cir. 1977). 
'"' 438 U.S. 567, 578 (19781. 
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wage discrimination to be created by showing that the plaintiff's 
job has traditionally been female- or minority-intensive. 181 This 
inference supposedly follows from the historical, anthropological, 
sociological, and ecpnomic studies outlined in Part I of Wage Dis-
crimination. 182 This article has concentrated predominantly on 
the problems associated with the creation of Professor Blum-
rosen's presumption of wage discrimination from the sexual iden-
tification of particular occupations in the American economy. As 
demonstrated in part II of the present article, this presumption 
would rest upon a very unstable foundation of social science evi-
dence. As shown in part ill, the presumption has no antecedents 
in Title VII's legislative history. Substantial problems would also 
exist, however, in the operation of this presumption in the 
courts. 
Under the Wage Discrimination theory "[t]o make a prima fa-
cie case of wage discrimination . . . a plaintiff should have to 
show only that the job has been and/or is presently identified as 
a minority or female job."183 The article asserts that a showing of 
job segregation may. be accomplished entirely by statistics, 
merely by showing that seventy percent or more of the occupants 
of the job are women or minorities, 184 and states: "Such a show-
ing would demonstrate that a depressed wage was one of the ad-
'"' "The establishment of present or past job segregation thus should create an infer-
ence of wage discrimination sufficient to constitute a prima facie case." Wage Discrimi-
nation, supra note 1, at 459. 
••• Impassable evidentiary barriers would prevent courts from drawing such an infer-
ence. As discussed in part I supra, the studies cited by Professor Blumrosen do not speak 
in a united voice regarding the causes of wage differences. Nor do these sources agree as 
to whether some fraction of the "earnings gap" between men and women is attributable 
to wage discrimination. Thus, Wage Discrimination and its sources are hardly subjects 
appropriate for judicial notice. See FRE 201. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, facts 
appropriate for judicial notice must be (1) not subject to reasonable dispute, or (2) capa-
ble of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot rea-
sonably be questioned. FRE 201(b). The studies cited in Wage Discrimination are 
neither. See also Alvary v. United States, 302 F.2d 790, 794 (2d Cir. 1962) (fact must be 
capable of ready verification); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 308 F. Supp. 679, 
684 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), modified, 449 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 409 
U.S. 363 (1973); 1 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE , 201(03] (1978). 
Professor Blumrosen does not discuss how the courts might be persuaded that her key 
inference is valid. Certainly the proposition that job separation implies wage discrimina-
tion cannot be proved by introduction into evidence of her article or the materials cited 
in that article. Such documents would be inadmissible hearsay. FRE 801-806. 
To persuade courts of the validity of Professor Blumrosen's proposed inference would 
require testimony by expert witnesses such as the economists, anthropologists, and other 
social scientists whom Blumrosen selectively cites. The fact that none of these social 
scientists has ever proposed the Blumrosen theory, much less claimed that the evidence 
exists to sustain it, suggests that the theory would have a dim future in the courts. 
183 Wage Discriminat_ion, supra note 1, at 459. 
,., Id. at 460-62. 
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verse effects of job segregation prohibited by Section 703(a)(2). 
The demonstration of such a wage rate would also establish a 
violation of Section 703(a)(l)."185 
Under this theory, a plaintiff would not need to show that his 
or her wage rate would have been higher in the absence of job 
separation. 186 The burden of proof would shift to the employer, 
who has "unique access to, possession of, and control over this 
evidence. " 187 The employer's defense would be impossible in 
nearly all cases because Wage Discrimination prescribes that the 
employer may not defend a wage structure on the ground that 
the pay simply reflects the market value of jobs. Wage Discrimi-
nation specifies that, "absent a showing to the contrary, the 
market rate reflects discriminatory factors .... " 188 Nor can the 
employer rely on a job evaluation system to sustain its burden of 
proof unless a successful demonstration can be made that the 
system is free of discriminatory factors. 189 Wage Discrimination's 
elaborate discussion of job evaluation systems makes a convinc-
ing case that such systems are by nature highly subjective. 
Hence, proof of freedom from bias would be impossible. As was 
discussed in part I of this article, economists are agreed that the 
marginal productivity of most jobs is indeterminable. Market 
rates, job evaluation systems, and marginal productivity analysis 
are the only possible scales an employer could use to defend its 
wage structure. Professor Blumrosen would rule out the first two 
as infected with bias, and the third does not exist except in the 
abstract calculus of microeconomic theory. The Wage Discrimi-
nation idea is thus a plaintiffs lawyer's dream: a simple count-
ing of noses establishes the prima facie case, shifting the burden 
of proof to the employer, and all methods of defense by which 
the employer might attempt to meet its burden of proof are ef-
fectively ruled out. In reality, the presumption Professor Blum-
rosen has created would be an irrebuttable one. 
2. The presumption cuts too broadly - Another problem 
with the presumption of wage discrimination concerns its appli-
cation to a particular employer's workforce. It is well docu-
mented that many women, for personal and cultural reasons, 
lack interest in certain types of jobs. Their preferences contrib-
ute to the concentration of women in traditional occupations. 
When the percentage of women in a job approaches the seventy 
"' Id. at 459. 
••• Id. at 466-68. 
'"' Id. at 468. 
'"' Id. at 488. 
••• Id. at 489. 
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percent standard that Wage Discrimination sets forth as estab-
lishing a prima facie case, should the employer refuse to hire any 
additional women? Should the employer discriminatorily assign 
women who seek a traditional women's job to a "non-segregated" 
(less than seventy-percent female) job category? Even if Profes-
sor Blumrosen's inference that job separation equals wage dis-
crimination is generally true, it may be quite mistaken in any 
specific case. Wage Discrimination gives the courts no way to 
discern when, if ever, the inference of wage discrimination is jus-
tified and when it is not. 
B. The Wage Discrimination Theory and Established Title 
VII Methods of Proof 
The undoing of the Wage Discrimination theory is the very 
ease with which it would establish a prima facie case. In effect, 
the theory mistakenly places the burden of proof upon employers 
to disprove discrimination. As shown below, this scheme is con-
trary to the established Title VII methods of proof. 
Under Title VII, two primary theories of discrimination, and 
thus two methods of proof, are available to private party plain-
tiffs: disparate treatment and disparate impact.190 The disparate 
treatment theory was first used, and is still primarily used, in 
individual actions. The disparate impact analysis, on the other 
hand, evolved from large-scale class actions in which plaintiffs 
alleged that particular employment selection criteria had a detri-
mental impact on a class of persons protected by Title VII. 
A disparate treatment case focuses on discriminatory motives 
behind the employer's action. Although the focus is on motive, 
the plaintiff need not prove intent. Rather, the claimant must 
initially prove that certain factors exist that would lead one to 
infer that the employer's decision was illegally motivated.191 The 
''° A third method of proof, demonstration of a pattern or practice of discrimination, is 
available to the federal government in suits prosecuted under § 707 of Title VII. 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1976). · 
"' In International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), the Court 
defined the disparate treatment method of proof as follows: 
"Disparate treatment" such as alleged in the present case is the most easily un-
derstood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less 
favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be 
inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment. 
Id. at 335 n.15. Although it has not been held that the plaintiff proceeding under a dispa-
rate treatment theory is required to submit direct proof of an unlawful motivation, the 
plaintiff must present a prima facie case of discrimination from which one can reasonably 
infer that the result in question was intended. See, e.g., Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 
438 U.S. 567 (1978); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For a dis-
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burden of proof is flexible, but the general principle is that the 
plaintiff must carry "the initial burden of offering evidence ade-
quate to create an inference that an employment decision was 
based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under the Act. " 192 
Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the bur-
den shifts to the defendant to present evidence of some legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. 193 Following such 
a showing, the plaintiff must produce evidence that the defen-
dant's claimed legitimate reasons are merely a pretext for an un-
derlying discriminatory motive. If the supposed legitimate rea-
sons are a pretext, the employer's action is illegal. 194 
Under the disparate impact theory, first enunciated in Griggs 
u. Duke Power Company, 195 a prima facie case is established by 
demonstration that an employment practice, neutral on its face, 
has an adverse impact upon one or more of the classes of individ-
uals protected under Title VII. No showing of discriminatory in-
tent or unequal treatment is required; instead the focus is upon 
the consequences of a particular employment practice. 196 
Once a disparate impact is established, the employer carries 
the burden of proving that the specific practice at issue is justi-
fied by business necessity. 
1. Disparate treatment under the Wage Discrimination the-
ory - Professor Blumrosen expects her theory to adhere largely 
to Title VII methods of proof under the disparate treatment 
standard in individual, non-class cases. She admits that "in a 
cussion of motive in Title VII cases, see generally A. Blumrosen, Strangers No More: All 
Workers Are Entitled to "Just Cause" Protection Under Title VII, 2 !Nous. REL. L.J. 519 
(1978); B. 8CHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1153-54 (1976). 
112 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977). 
113 See, e.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (19781; Board of Trustees of 
Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978). 
'" McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
19
• 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In Griggs, the Court was faced with the question of whether an 
employer was prohibited by Title VII from requiring a high school education or the pass-
ing of a standardized general intelligence test as a condition of employment in or transfer 
to jobs when: (a) neither standard was shown to be significantly related to successful job 
performance; (b I both requirements operated to disqualify blacks at a substantially 
higher rate than white applicants; and (c) the jobs in question formerly had been filled 
only by white employees as part of a long-standing practice of giving preference to 
whites. Id. at 425-26. hi this landmark decision, the Court ruled that if an employment 
practice which operates to exclude blacks cannot be shown to be related to job perform-
ance, the practice is prohibited by Title VII. Id. at 431. 
"' Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971). For example, both Griggs and 
the later case of Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), dealt with employ-
ment tests. In these cases, the Court held that in order to establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination, plaintiffs had only to establish that the tests in question, although 
facially neutral, caused the selection for hire or promotion in a racial pattern significantly 
or substantially different from the pool of available applicants. See note 195 supra. 
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non-class action individual case charging discrimination in com-
pensation based only on a theory of disparate treatment, the 
plaintiff would have to show that the depressed wage was ra-
cially or sexually motivated." 197 Even in the individual disparate 
treatment case under Professor Blumrosen's theory, the plaintiff 
would have to make a statistical showing that his or her job is or 
once was race- or sex-segregated in order to activate the infer-
ence of wage discrimination. With respect to Wage Discrimina-
. tion's suggestion that statistical evidence alone could establish 
the necessary discriminatory motive under a disparate treatment 
theory, the article fails to take into account the lack of consensus 
under Title VII as to the extent to which classwide evidence 
should be considered probative in an action brought by a single 
person. 198 
2. Disparate impact and the Wage Discrimination theory -
Wage Discrimination never explicitly states in one place that its 
theory that job segregation implies wage discrimination is 
merged with a disparate impact analysis. It is clear that a dispa-
rate impact approach is intended. 199 To mold the idea that job 
separation establishes a prima facie case of wage discrimination 
into disparate impact terms, it would have to be argued that the 
employer's wage structure is a facially neutral employment prac-
tice that promotes consequences yiolative of Title VII by its ad-
verse impact upon the wages of women and minorities in female-
or minority-intensive jobs. 
The application of a disparate impact method of proof to the 
job segregation-wage discrimination theory is specious. Under 
past employment discrimination cases, a disparate impact ap-
proach has been applied to specific employment practices such 
as testing policies,· college degree hiring requirements, hiring ex-
clusions of applicants who had arrest records, and discharge 
rules based upon garnishments.200 Wage Discrimination does not 
"' Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 460. 
"' See, e.g., Davis v. Califano, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 272 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (statisti-
cal evidence may be used to establish an individual plaintiff's prima facie case). But see 
McFadden v. Baltimore Steamship Trade Ass'n, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 300 (D.C. Md.), 
aff'd, 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 599 (4th Cir. 1973) (an individual plaintiff may not use 
statistics, but must present evidence of specific acts of racial discrimination against him 
in order to establish prima facie case); accord, Harper v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 525 
F.2d 409, 412-14 (8th Cir. 1975); King v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 523 F.2d 879, 882 
(8th Cir. 1975). 
'" Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 463. 
zoo See, e.g., Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1974) (employer policy 
requiring discharge for two garnishments within 12 months held a prima facie violation of 
. Title VII); Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972) (requirement 
of college degree for pilots is job related); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 349 F. 
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propose a disparate impact analysis of a specific employer prac-
tice but rather a wholesale assault on the employer's wage 
structure. 
One suspects that the difficulty Professor Blumrosen en-
counters in elucidating how this wage discrimination approach is 
to be applied under a disparate impact method of proof stems 
largely from her article's quicksilver use of the term "job segre-
gation." On the one hand, she applies the term as it has histori-
cally been used in Title VIl case law: the intentional segregation 
of occupations by sex or race. On the other hand, she uses "job 
segregation" to denote the lingering presence of traditional 
women's jobs or minorities' jobs, no longer intentionally segre-
gated, but disproportionately populated by members of these 
groups. This phenomenon might be termed "transitional" job 
separation, no longer intentional in most cases, but unavoidable 
in a period in which "the time lag in wage rate revision means 
that for most of those jobs the wage structure still reflects the 
depressed rate which was associated with its segregated charac-
ter. "201 Professor Blumrosen supports her argument' by exploiting 
the ambiguity in this double-jointed definition of "job segrega-
tion." She buttresses her contention that the Title VII standard 
of proof ( that a plaintiff need not prove the amount he or she 
would have earned in the absence of discrimination) should ap-
ply in wage discrimination suits by citing several cases in which 
discriminatory job assignments or the existence of segregated job 
classifications were held to establish a prima facie violation of 
Title VII without a demonstration of economic harm.202 But in 
these cases the plaintiffs had clearly demonstrated that the de-
fendants had discriminatorily assigned them to lower status po-
sitions. The courts have long held that plaintiffs in cases of dis-
criminatory assignments do not have to submit evidence of lower 
pay as an element of their prima facie case.203 These decisions, 
however, do not support the argument that, where "transitional 
job separation" is combined with the absence of a discriminatory 
Supp. 3 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd, 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974) (high school diploma not 
job related}; Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 491, af/'d, 472 F.2d 631 (9th 
Cir. 1972) (policy of excluding applicants with arrest records violates Title VII). 
201 Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 460. 
202 Id. at 463-65. Among these cases are Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 539 F.2d 77 (5th 
Cir. 1976) (discrimination in job assignments established prima facie case); James v. 
Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977) (discriminatory job assign-
ments and segregated facilities violated Title VII); Reed v. Arlington Hotel Co., Inc., 476 
F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1973) (maintenance of segregated job classifications established Title 
VII violation). 
203 Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Swint v. Pullman-Stan-
dard, 539 F.2d 77, 90 (5th Cir. 1976). 
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assignment, a wage discrimination plaintiff need not show eco-
nomic disparity, but only that her job contains over seventy per-
cent women, in order to demonstrate a prima facie violation of 
Title VII. 
It is clear that Professor Blumrosen uses the term "job segre-
gation," in both of its definitions, as a mechanism to pull wage 
discrimination into the remedial ambit of Title VII. Her article 
is unconcerned with past Title VII remedies for job segregation, 
e.g., hires, transfers, and promotions into higher status jobs, 
which it terms inadequate; the article seeks more money for in-
dividuals who stay in the traditional jobs. Professor Blumrosen 
views the problem of wage discrimination as one of the "discrim-
inatory radiations from job segregation."204 The chief problem 
here is that Congress intended either to deal with these problems 
separately or, more charitably to Professor Blumrosen's view, 
never made the linkage between the problems at all. From the 
existing legislative history, it certainly appears that Congress in-
tended to remedy wage discrimination through the EPA stan-
dards, whether suit is brought under that statute or under Title 
VII.205 The result is that the disparate impact approach of Title 
VII is inapplicable to wage compensation suits. 
3. Title VII wage discrimination cases - All Title VII wage 
discrimination decisions have placed the burden of proof upon 
the plaintiff to demonstrate that the wage inequity was the re-
sult of prohibited discrimination. 
In the leading case in this area, Christensen v. Iowa, 208 the 
plaintiffs were female clerical workers who received less pay than 
physical plant workers, who were primarily male, for dissimilar 
work of equal value to their employer. The plaintiffs claimed 
that they were victims of sex-based compensation discrimination 
prohibited by Title VII. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit held that apart from considerations of the Bennett Amend-
20• Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 465. 
• 05 See part II supra. 
'"' 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977). Christensen is not cited in the text of Wage Discrimi-
nation (though it is cited in the footnotes, see Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 489 
n.327 & 495 n.345), no doubt because the case was predicated on a Title VII job compara-
bility theory of wage discrimination that Professor Blumrosen seeks to distinguish from a 
wage discrimination theory predicated upon job segregation. 
The EEOC submitted an amicus brief in Christensen, taking the position that the uni-
versity's maintenance of wage disparities between male and female jobs that it knew 
were of equal value amounted to unlawful discrimination under Title VII because (1 l the 
university was aware that the wage disparities in the labor market were largely the result 
of societal discrimination, and (2) the university made no attempt to determine the ex-
tent to which the wage differentials were justified by economic factors or required by 
business necessity. 
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ment's applicability, 207 plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima 
facie case under Title VII because they had not shown that "the 
difference in wages paid to clerical workers and plant employees 
rested on sex discrimination and not on some other legitimate 
reason."208 The evidence established that the employer paid 
higher wages to plant workers because higher wages were paid 
for such work in the local labor market. 209 
The Christensen court noted the plaintiffs' attempt to fit their 
complaint to the disparate impact method of proof.210 The court 
then decisively rejected this theory on the basis that Title VII 
does not apply to wage scales at all. Title VII, Christensen holds, 
is directed at equal·. employment opportunities, not equal 
wages. 211 
In a second recent federal court decision, Lemons v. City and 
County of Denver, 212 the court held that the city had not violated 
Title VII despite the plaintiffs' contention that the defendants 
paid nurses, a female-dominated profession, less than it paid 
other employees for work of comparable value in male-domi-
207 The Christensen court explicitly left the Bennett Amendment issue unresolved. If 
the court had held that the Bennett Amendment applied, the plaintiffs would have had 
to demonstrate that the work of the clerical and plant workers was "substantially equal" 
in order to make out a prima facie case under Title Vll. 
zoa Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 355 (8th Cir. 1977). 
The decision in Christensen could equally well have been reached on an alternative 
ground that the court did not discuss. Even if the plaintiffs' evidence met the disparate 
impact criteria for a prima facie case, the employer rebutted that case by showing that 
its actions were required by business necessity. In a free market economy, the necessity 
to hold costs, including wages, down to those mandated by the market is the most press-
ing business necessity of all, the sine qua non of business survival. 
ZIii The court stated: 
Appellants' theory ignores economic realities. The value of the job to the em-
ployer represents but one factor affecting wages. Other factors may include the 
supply of workers willing to do the job and the ability of the workers to band 
together to bargain collectively for higher wages. We find nothing in the text and 
history of Title VIl suggesting that Congress intended to abrogate the laws of 
supply and demand or other economic principles that determine wage rates for 
various kinds of work. We do not interpret Title VIl as requiring an employer to 
ignore the market in setting wage rates for genuinely different work 
classifications. 
Id. at 356. 
21• Appellants contend the [defendant] UNl's policy violates Title VII by perpet-
uating wage differences resulting from past discrimination. . . . [The contention 
is that] UNI's reliance in part on prevailing wage rates in determining beginning 
pay scales for jobs of equal worth to the university serves to carry over the effects 
of sex discrimination in the marketplace into the wage policies of the college. 
Id. at 355-56. 
211 Id. at 356. Judge Miller disagreed with this basis of the court's opinion, but con-
curred because he found the Bennett Amendment applicable. Id. at 357 (concurring 
opinion). 
212 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 906 (D. Colo. 1978), alf'd DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 81 
at D-1 (10th Cir. April 24, 1980). -
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nated occupations. As in Christensen, the court stated that there 
had been no showing of wage differentials based directly or indi-
rectly on sex discrimination except insofar as historical discrimi-
nation had created a lower pay scale for certain occupations tra-
ditionally performed by women. The court found that the city 
had simply relied on market forces in setting its pay scales.213 
The court had grave misgivings concerning an approach to wage 
discrimination that ignored labor market economics, stating: 
"Congress cannot, and never has been able, to repeal the law of 
supply and demand. And the situation, unfortunate that it may 
be, is that the supply of nurses is very large compared to the 
demand, and it puts the nurses in a somewhat disadvantageous 
negotiating position. "214 
It should be noted that even in Gunther v. County of Wash-
ington, 215 an appellate decision supporting the argument that the 
Bennett Amendment incorporates only the four affirmative de-
fenses of the EPA into Title VII and that, therefore, a Title VII 
wage discrimination claim may be asserted when the pay differ-
ential is not between "substantially equal" jobs, the burden to 
demonstrate· sex discrimination remained on the plaintiff. The 
court held that on remand plaintiffs should have an opportunity 
to show that "some of the discrepancy in wages was due to sex • discrimination. " 216 
These cases uniformly have held that the burden of proof is 
upon the plaintiffs in Title VII compensation cases to establish a 
prima facie case that an inequality in pay is based upon sex dis-
crimination. Even more important, Christensen and Lemons em-
phatically indicate that the local labor market may be consid-
ered by the employer in setting wage rates. In the words of the 
Christensen court, to ignore such market rates "ignores economic 
realities. "211 
m Id. at 913. 
'" Id. at 909. As Chief Judge Winner perceived the issue in Lemons, the acceptance of 
the plaintiffs' view that Title VII can reach wage discrimination not actionable under the 
EPA wo_uld open "the Pandora's box of restructuring the entire economy of the United 
States of America." Id. 
"' 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979). 
"' Id. at 888, 894. 
m Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 356 (8th Cir. 1977). Wage Discrimination cites 
Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974), for the proposition that the market 
rate or "community wage structure" is not a defense to a Title VII wage discrimination 
claim. Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 488-89. The citation is inapposite. Corning 
Glass did not involve Title VII at all, but rather the EPA, and in that case the employer 
attempted to use "market price" as a defense for its practice of paying women Jess than 
men for substantially the same job. This was the very evil that the EPA was designed to 
remedy. The courts have Jong held that market forces will not justify a wage inequality 
when men's and women's jobs are substantially equal in job content. See, e.g., Hodgson 
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IV. THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE 
Congress could, if it chose to do so, enlarge the EPA or Title 
VII to include "comparable worth." The law would then require 
that all "men's" and "women's" jobs be paid identically except 
for pay differences proportionate to the relative "worth" of jobs. 
By incorporating the comparable worth theory into the law, Con-
gress would be mandating an entire scale of relative wages, leav-
ing to the courts the formidable task of spelling out the details. 
This section will set forth several reasons why such- a statute 
would be unwise. 
A. The Measurability of Wage Discrimination 
Professor Blumrosen has argued that the courts should adapt 
remedial statutes such as Title VII "to address those problems 
which come newly into focus. "218 The converse is no less true: the 
courts - and Congress - should refrain from attempting to ad-
dress alleged problems that cannot be brought into focus. De-
spite Professor Blumrosen's exposition, wage discrimination re-
mains an amorphous theory and an unmeasurable concept. We 
have explained in part I why it appears that wage discrimination 
cannot be dissected from other and legitimate sources of wage 
differentials. Even if advances in economic theory might some-
day change the situation, the experts agree that the necessary 
analytif al methodology does not exist today. 219 
This is not the familiar problem of evaluating a damage that 
is by nature imprecise: the courts cope well enough with even 
such inexact quantities as the value of life itself. The problem 
with wage discrimination is of another magnitude altogether. 
Residual wage differentials could arise in part from wage dis-
crimination, but they also could - and at least in part do -
arise from other causes.220 Any statute that attempted to require 
the courts to discern and measure such indeterminate quantities 
would only mire our legal machinery in judicial quicksand. 
v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1970). The touchstone of the EPA is 
job content: when it is the same for men and women, market rates are irrelevant. But see 
Horner v. Mary Institute, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 13, at A-4 (8th Cir. Jan. 18, 1980), 
in which the court stated in dictum that, if the plaintiff had shown that her job was 
substantially equal to that of a male colleague, his higher salary would still have been 
justified by his greater value in the job market. 
118 Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 502. 
m See Kahne & Kohen, supra note 81, at 1258-61, who acknowledge that economic 
theory and analysis of male-female wage differentials are in a state of disarray. See also 
J. MADDEN, supra note 72, at 20-23; and Aigner & Cain, supra note 125, at 187-88. 
zzo See part I supra. 
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B. Equitable Enforcement of the Comparble Worth Theory 
The difficulty becomes apparent as soon as one descends from 
the abstractions of theory to outline how comparable worth the-
ory could be applied to the realities of a wage structure. Sup-
pose, .for example, that a bias-free, universal job evaluation sys-
tem has been developed and · has been applied to the wage 
structures of the Shady Dell and Moderne nursing homes: 
FIGURE 2 
Shady Dell Modeme 
Job Evaluation Job 
System Points Title Sex Salary Sex Salary 
40 gardener M $8,000 M $7,250 
50 
60 attendant F 8,000 F 8,000 
70 
80 nurse F 16,000 F 14,500 
90 administrator M 17,000 F 14,995 
100 physician M 40,000 
If Title VII were amended to incorporate the comparable worth 
theory, to what salaries would the female employees be entitled? 
If "comparable" means "equal," they presumably would not be 
entitled to relief under Title Vll: no male job is equal in "worth" 
(job evaluation systems points) to a female job. Suppose, then, 
that "comparable" is given a more expansive meaning: male and 
female jobs must be paid in proportion to their point value in 
the job evaluation system. 
Shady Dell's nurses file suit for an injunction to raise their sal-
ary from the present $16,000 to $32,000, their rightful proportion 
(80%) of the physicians' salary. The nursing home owner argues 
that the nurses are fairly paid: their job is "worth" twice as 
much as the (male) gardeners' job and is paid proportionately 
more, $16,000 as compared with $8,000. Further, the employer ar-
gues, the job most nearly comparable to the nurses' in "worth" is 
the administrators' job. Administrators are "worth" one-eighth 
more than nurses but earn only one-sixteenth more. Meanwhile, 
the attendants demand $24,000 (60% of the physicians' salary), 
and the employer must pay them that amount, or at least 
$12,000 (150% of the gardeners' salary), or $11,333 (66-2/3% of 
the administrators' salary) or something in between. Comparable 
worth theorists have not discussed which "male" jobs would be 
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used for comparison purposes. It would take the wisdom of Solo-
mon to solve this conundrum. But even Solomon could not do 
equity as between Shady Dell and Moderne. Moderne has .no 
physicians on its staff; it contracts out for their services. Its 
nurses have no comparable worth claim, for they are paid twice 
as much as Moderne's only male employees, the gardeners, and 
their job is "worth" twice as much. Moderne's attendants, how-
ever, do have a claim: their job is "worth" 50% more than the 
gardeners', so perhaps they will have to be paid $10,875. 
If the outcome is that Shady Dell must pay its nurses $32,000 
and Moderne must pay its attendants $10,875, a further develop-
ment is reasonably foreseeable. Shady Dell and Moderne will 
likely succumb to competitors that contract out for the services 
· of physicians and gardeners. 221 
The difficulty of doing equity by mathematics at the hypothet-
ical Shady Dell and Moderne would be far more complicated -
and still more impossible - in the far more complex real world. 
C. Financial Burdens on Government and Business 
1. Direct costs - Among the direct costs of comparable 
worth theory would be the regulatory expenses of agencies in the 
Executive Branch, expenses of the courts, and litigation costs of 
employers and employees. These costs would be a great deal 
larger than for Title VII because Professor Blumrosen's proposed 
standard of proof would give a winning case to the great majority 
of all female employees.222 Employers would also bear the consid-
221 For examples of analogous actual developments in the equal pay area, see Gluck-
lich, Hall, Povall & Snell, Equal Pay: Time to Go Back to the Drawing Board, 9 PERSON-
NEL MANAGEMENT 16 (No. 1 January 1977). 
m See part ill supra. Moreover, an employer's potential liability under a Title VII 
wage discrimination action would, in most cases, be far greater than under a correspond-
ing Title VII-EPA wage claim, which requires that a plaintiff demonstrate a prims facie 
case under EPA standards. For example, assume that a large manufacturing enterprise, 
which encompasses several plants located in a dozen states, faces a class action liability 
under Professor Blumrosen's theory that it has underpaid clerical employees, who are 
primarily women, on a company-wide basis. Under the Blumrosen approach to Title VII 
job comparability, the plaintiffs could seek damages for wage discrimination on a com-
pany-wide basis. However, under the existing Title VII-equal pay cases, the plaintiffs 
would be restricted by the EPA's standards, which require a plaintiff to demonstrate that 
a wage differential existed for equal work within the same establishment. Orr v. Frank R. 
McNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166, 170-71 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975). 
But see Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 449 F. Supp. 397, 16 Empl. Prac. Dec.~ 8343 
(W.D. Pa. 1978) ("establishment" requirement of EPA not a limitation on Title VII-
equal pay claims). Because a Title VII wage discrimination case under Professor Blum-
rosen's theory would no longer be circumscribed by any EPA standards - including the 
establishment requirment - an employer's potential liability would be explosively 
expanded. 
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erable cost of installing and maintaining job evaluation systems. 
2. Indirect costs - One of the largest costs of the comparable 
worth theory would be a distortion of the economy as employers 
struggle to pay market rates rather than rates dictated by a uni-
versal job evaluation system. Adoption of the comparable worth 
theory would not relieve employers of the constraints of the 
market. The costs of raw materials and capital and the prices that 
could be charged would still depend on market forces. Employers 
would, of course, attempt to find loopholes through which they 
could pay market prices for labor. The history of the Internal 
Revenue Code is instructive in this respect. The efflorescing of 
section upon section, the piling of regulation upon regulation, is 
largely the natural result of taxpayers' ingenuity in finding ways to 
comply with the letter of the law while avoiding the taxes that the 
law intended to impose. Some of the tactics for avoiding 
comparable worth theory are outlined below: 
a. Export of jobs. Large numbers of "women's" jobs are suit-
able for export. Clothing, for example, can be manufactured as 
readily in Hong Kong and Seoul as in New York City. This is 
why the union with the highest proportion of female members of 
any major union, the International Ladies Garment Workers 
Union, is so vehemently opposed to the comparable worth move-
ment. The president of that union has stated: "I'll be damned if 
I know a way to get the women more money . . . . The value of 
their work isn't set by theoretical principles but on the value of 
the work in the marketplace and in the face of competition from 
overseas, where garment workers make 30 cents an hour."223 
b. Contracting out. Businesses already contract out for ser-
vices whose wage structures fit awkwardly with the primary en-
terprise. For example, many businesses contract for the services 
of attorneys and physicians at the high end of the scale, and for 
food service workers and janitorial services at the low end. Con-
tracting out large numbers of traditionally "female" or "male" 
jobs would be expensive, both for the individual enterprise and 
for the economy as a whole. For a company faced with enor-
mously increased labor costs, however, even large sacrifices in ef- · 
ficiency would be economically attractive. Consider, for exampl~, 
an appliance retailer who employs office workers, a sales force, 
and repairmen. Almost all the office workers are female; almost 
all the others are male. Assume that Congress had adopted the 
comparable worth theory and mandated the use of a job evalua-
223 Address by S. Chaikin, President, ILGWU, AFL-CIO Annual Convention, Washing-
ton, D.C. (Nov. 15-20, 1979), quoted in The New Pay Push for Women, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 
17, 1979, at 69. 
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tion sy.stem developed by the NAS as the standard by which 
"worth" must be assessed. According to this system, the "worth" 
of the salesmen is forty-three percent more than that of the office 
workers, and the "worth" of the repairmen is twenty-seven per-
cent more than that of the office workers. The company has been 
paying both salesmen and repairmen ninety percent more than 
office workers. 
The company is in a dilemma. It cannot afford to raise the 
office workers' salaries as high as the job evaluation system man-
dates, because the profit margins in its business are too low. It 
cannot cut the men's salaries, both because the law prohibits it 
and because the market value of the men's skills would enable 
them to move to the greener pastures of self-employment or 
other employment rather than take large pay cuts. In the long 
run it is likely that the salesmen and the repairmen will move to 
independent, self-employed jobs, or will organize themselves in 
business enterprises which are too small to come under the juris-
diction of Title Vll, or which consist of all male repairmen and/ 
or all male salesmen. These men will then be able to earn "mar-
ket" recompense for their efforts. Such an atomized fragmenta-
tion of business organizations is probably quite inefficient and 
would raise the costs of goods and services to the entire society. 
c. Overturning congressional determination of the minimum 
wage. Setting the minimum wage rate requires a balancing of 
competing considerations.22• The balancing of complex, unquan-
tifiable factors is the sort of decision-making that is best suited 
to the legislature, not the judiciary. To a large extent, Professor 
Blumrosen's proposal would take the minimum wage decision 
away from Congress and the states. For affected occupations, the 
courts would be required to set the wages, and to decide without 
reference to the many legitimate factors that economists and in-
terest groups place before national and state legislatures.225 In-
zu The interests affected by the minimum wage are far more complex than those of 
employers versus workers. Increases in minimum wages benefit not only low-wage em-
ployees, but also medium-wage employers, who are freed of competition from low-wage 
employers. Some low-wage employees benefit from higher wages, but others suffer recur-
rent or even permanent unemployment, as their jobs are lost to automation, imported 
goods, and/or illegal alien workers. See, e.g., C. STEWART, JR., Low-WAGE WORKERS IN AN 
AFFLUENT SOCIETY (1974); Falconer, The Minimum Wage: A Perspective, 3 FEDERAL RE-
SERVE BANK or NEW YORK QUARTERLY R.Ev. 3 (Autumn 1978); Kosters & Welch, The Ef-
fects of Minimum Wages by Race, Sex, and Age, in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN ECONOMIC 
LIFE, supra note 80, at 103; Moore, The Effect of Minimum Wages on Teenage Unem-
ployment Rates, 79 J. PoL. EcoN. 897 (1971); Weintraub, A Comment on Regional Differ-
entials in the Differential Between Nonwhite and White Unemployment Rates, 79 J. PoL. 
ECON. 200 (1971). 
111 See, e.g., L. WEINER, FEDERAL WAGE AND HOUR LAW 14-19 (1977), for a discussion of 
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stead, the courts would have to set wages according to inferences 
from abstract theory. 
The occupations affected would be those that are female-in-
tensive and are paid at or near the minimum wage. A number of 
such jobs, employing many thousands of people, are likely to be 
among those affected by comparable worth theory.228 Wages set 
by reference to only one factor - comparable worth - would 
likely be much further from the optimum than wages set by leg-
islative bodies, which are free to attend to all factors. 227 
Illegal immigration is one example of the serious problems 
that would be exacerbated if minimum wages were set by a com-
parable worth theory formula rather than by legislative decision. 
The higher the minimum wage, the more displacement of legal 
workers by illegal aliens. This is no mere marginal problem; for 
example, an estimated sixty to seventy percent of garment work-
ers employed in the United States are illegal aliens.228 If garment 
worker minimum wages are raised by application of comparable 
worth theory, it is logical to expect that still more citizens and 
legal aliens will be replaced by illegal aliens. 229 
d. lnfiation. Implementation of comparable worth theory 
would increase the wages of many women, but it would not in-
crease productivity at all. The result would be massive infla-
tion. 230 Excessive inflation harms the entire economy by encour-
aging immediate consumption at the expense of savings and 
the policy and purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 
(1976) (FLSA), the principal federal statute prescribing minimum wage and overtime 
coverage. With respect to both minimum wage and overtime, the FLSA contains a com-
plex array of industry exemptions. Id. at 109-45. 
m Jobs likely to be affected include garment trades, entry level clerical jobs, food ser-
vice workers, and hospital and nursing home attendants. See, e.g., M. WITI' & P. 
NAHERNY, WOMEN'S WoRIC - UP FROM .878 (Univ. of Wis. Extension, Madison 1975). 
227 Congress cannot satisfy all the diverse interests, but it can take many interests into 
account in setting minimum wages. The comparable worth theory would take account of 
,w interests, but would operate on the basis of its theory alone. 
m AFL-C/0 Adamant Against Illegal Aliens, S. F. Chronicle, Feb. 26, 1980, at 23, col. 
1. 
m Illegal aliens impose substantial costs on the economy. Some of the most important 
costs, such as welfare payments to unemployed legal residents who are displaced, are 
difficult to estimate. At least one cost item can be determined: the cost of apprehending 
and expelling illegal immigrants. The Immigration and Naturalization Service expelled 
1,430,902 illegal aliens in 1977 alone, an activity that must have cost a very substantial 
amount. CONGRESSIONAL REsEARCH SERVICE, U.S. IMMIGRATION LAw AND POLICY 1952-1979 
at 34, Table 2 (1979). 
= It has been estimated that the total dollar amount required annually to achieve pay 
parity between full-time working women and men in the United States would be $150 
billion. Smith, supra note 134, at 58-59. The addition of this staggering sum to employee 
wages would generate an enormous inflationary reaction within the economy. 
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investment. 231 
D. The Effect of the Comparable Worth Theory on Women 
The inflationary consequences of implementation of the com-
parable worth theory would affect different groups unequally. 
Women working in traditionally female jobs would be 'protected, 
provided their employers also have traditionally male jobs and 
fill them with men. The comparable worth law would raise such 
women's wages. These women's husbands and children would 
also benefit, as would their ex-spouses.232 But other groups, prob-
ably including the large majority of women, would suffer di~pro-
portionate losses of purchasing power. These groups include: 
most married women and their dependents, for the majority of 
married women are not employed outside the home;233 all non-
employed single women and their dependents (especially 
mothers on welfare to the extent that welfare allowances lag be-
hind inflation); all non-employed widows and retired women;234 
all women working in traditionally "mixed" jobs and in tradi-
tionally "men's". jobs; and all women working in traditionally 
"women's" jobs, but in all-female work forces, e.g., nursery 
schools and child care centers, or for employers too small to be 
covered by Title VII. This last group includes the most poorly 
paid of all employees, private household workers. 
Thus, the· income redistributed by comparable worth theory 
would flow mainly to single women and to families without 
young children. The additional real income to those groups 
would be taken largely from families in which one or more 
women were not working because of age, illness, or the need to 
care for young children. We doubt that a convincing case could 
be made that such a redistribution of real income would be ben-
eficial to the nation as a whole. 
231 P. SAMUELSON, supra note 46, at 273. 
232 Former husbands would benefit from reductions in the need for child support and 
alimony. 
m In May 1979, 46.4% of married women were employed, 2.1% were unemployed, and 
51.6% were not in the labor force. U.S. DEP'T or LABOR, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE:· 
SOME NEW DATA SERIES 5, Table 6 (Report No. 575, 1979). But see 102 L.R.R.M. 98 
(1979) (prediction that by 1990 "the stereotype of the wife as one who stays home with 
the children will apply to about a quarter of all married women," citing THE SUBTLE 
REVOLUTION: WOMEN AT WoRIC (H. Barrett ed. 1979)). 
2" Widowers, retired men, and the wives of retired men would also suffer a loss of 
purchasing power, but because of women's longer life span, the group of older persons is 
primarily female. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 
(1978) ("(W]omen, as a class, do live longer than men"). 
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E. The Effect of the Comparable Worth Theory on Job 
Integration 
295 
The ultimate goal of Title VII is the achievement of equality of 
employment opportunities.235 This goal is attainable in the work-
place only through job integration. The adoption of a compara-
ble worth appraoch to wage discrimination would inhibit, per-
haps even imperil, the attainment of job integration. 
The legislative histories of Title VII and its 1972 amendments 
demonstrate that Congress' principal motivation for the enact-
ment of these statutes was to remedy pervasive exclusionary dis-
crimination in employment, especially against blacks.238 The pri-
mary intent of Congress was to end job segregation or, more 
broadly stated, to end the segregation of employment opportuni-
ties.237 With respect to sex discrimination, Congress was chiefly, 
and almost exclusively, concerned with the problem of job segre-
gation resulting from discrimination in hiring, promotion, re-
cruitment, and job assignment. For example, the Senate Report 
reviewing the administration of the sex discrimination provisions 
of Title VII during the enactment of the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Act of 1972238 stated: "Despite the large increase in the 
numbers of women in the work force, women continue to be rele-
gated to low paying positions and are precluded from high pay-
ing executive positions. Similarly, the rate of advancement for 
women is slower than for men in similar positions. "239 The House 
Report echoed the same concern: "Women are subject to eco-
nomic deprivation as a class. Their self-fulfillment and develop-
ment is frustrated because of their sex. Numerous studies have 
shown that women are placed in the less challenging, the less 
235 "The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language 
of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities .... " Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971). 
231 110 CONG. REC. 6548 (1964)(remarks of Senator Humphrey); id. at 7204-05 (remarks 
of Senator Clark); United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,_ U.S.-, 99 S. Ct. 2721, 
2729 (1979). 
237 110 CONG. REc. 6547-48 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey); id. at 6552 (remarks 
of Senator Kennedy). See also Blumrosen, The Duty of Fair Recruitment Under the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 22 RUTGERS L. REv. 465 (1968), in which Professor Alfred Blumrosen, 
who is the husband of the author of Wage Discrimination, stated: "Discrimination in 
recruitment and hiring is the chief measurable evil against which the modem law of em-
ployment discrimination is directed .... The elimination of minority differential in un-
employment rates will be a true signal that equal employment opportunity does in fact 
exist." Id. at 465-66. 
"' 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (1976). 
231 S. REP. No. 92-415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AcT OF 1972 at 416 (Comm. Print 1972) [hereinafter 
cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF EEO). 
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responsible and the less remunerative positions on the basis of 
their sex alone."240 
The legislative record is bereft of any reference to comparable 
worth or wage discrimination, so Professor Blumrosen's assertion 
that Congress dealt with wage discrimination as one of the "dis-
criminatory radiations of job segregation"241 has no basis in fact. 
Instead, the legislative focus was upon job segregation itself and 
the removal of discriminatory barriers barring women from more 
challenging, responsible, and remunerative positions. 
A comparable worth approach to residual wage differentials 
would not bring our society closer to the goal of job integration. 
Such an approach would quash perhaps the most powerful in-
centive for women to enter occupations historically held by men: 
the prospect of higher pay. If employers are required to pay 
higher wages for traditional "women's" jobs, women holding 
those jobs will have substantially less incentive to become pio-
neers in integrating the predominantly male jobs. Almost cer-
tainly the result would be a decrease in the movement of women 
into "men's" jobs. 
Another and even more deleterious consequence of the imple-
mentation of comparable worth theory is the fact that it would 
give employers large incentives to segregate their work forces. 
Under a comparable worth theory, particularly under Professor 
Blumrosen's variant, 242 it is impossible for an employer to know 
whether or not it is in compliance with Title VII. Even the most 
well-intentioned of employers would face substantial liability in 
"comparable worth" back pay awards. The necessity of remain-
ing competitive in the marketplace would spawn employer 
avoidance techniques. In order to reduce the uncertainty of com-
pliance and minimize exposure to large damage awards, as well 
as compete in the marketplace, employers would seek to escape 
comparable worth problems by contracting out work. In many 
cases the subcontractors would be single-sex organizations that 
would not be affected by Title VII wage discrimination 
liability. 243 
"" H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
OF EEO, supra note 239, at 64. 
"' Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 465. 
"' Under Professor Blumrosen's theory, employers would be virtually precluded from a 
defense of pay differentials on the basis that the differences reflect the external labor 
market or that they conform to an internal job evaluation system. See text accompanying 
notes 188-89 supra. 
" 3 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). Under this section of Title VII "(i)t shall not be 
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of com-
pensation . . . to employees who work at different locations . . . . " Because this section 
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Finally, Professor Blumrosen's approach would inhibit job in-
tegration by imposing liability on those employers who actively 
pursued job integration as well as on those who did not.244 Em-
ployers then surely would neglect their affirmative action and 
equal employment opportunity efforts because they would see 
that no matter how much financial investment they made, they 
would still face very large liabilities. 
F. Existing Remedies 
Rejection of the comparable worth theory by no means implies 
acceptance of wage discrimination. The statute books already 
contain a formidable armamentarium of laws whose impacts are 
reducing the wage differentials between the sexes. The EPA245 
and many similar state statutes246 prohibit the most direct form 
of sex discrimination in wages, unequal pay for equal work. Sub-
stantial awards have been granted under the EPA,247 and its ef-
fects spread far beyond the cases that have gone to judgment. As 
with most statutes, cases that go to trial are only a small frac-
tion of the cases that are settled, and the cases that are settled 
are only a fraction of the cases that might have been brought 
were it not for widespread voluntary compliance with the law. 
The EPA does not reach allegations of wage discrimination in-
volving dissimilar jobs, but Title VII and similar state statutes 
in the large majority of states are powerful indirect forces against 
restricts Title VII's application to one "location" of a single employer, it is implausible 
that Congress intended Title VII wage comparisons to be made between different employ-
ers at different locations. 
2" The employer who brought men into what had been "women's" jobs would be no 
less liable than the employer who maintained a segregated work force. Wage Discrimina-
tion, supra note 1, at 498-99. Nor could the employer decrease its liability by increasing 
the wage for the traditional women's job. Under the Wage Discrimination presumption, 
the mere fact of a job that is or was female-intensive creates an inference of illegal wage 
discrimination-no matter what wage the employer actually pays. See text accompany-
ing notes 183-84 supra. 
m 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976). 
"' Thirty-seven states presently have statutes, similar to the EPA, proscribing unequal 
pay for equal work. SA FAIR EMPL. PRAc. MAN. (BNA) 499, 503 (1980). See, e.g., CAL. LAB. 
CODE § 1197.5 (Deering Supp. 1979). 
"' See, e.g., 2 EQUAL EMPLOYER (FED.) ,r 2 (Jan. 2, 1978) (Smith College agreed to pay 
$136,000 in back wages to 143 female custodial emplo~ees in settlement of EPA action 
brought by the Department of Labor (DOL)); 1 EQUAL EMPLOYER (FED.) ,r 297 (Aug. 29, 
1977) (Iowa school district agreed to settle EPA action filed by DOL on behalf of 27 
women custodial employees for "over $100,000"); 1 EQUAL EMPLOYER (FED.) ,r 147 (Apr. 
25, 1977) (Cambridge, Massachusetts, settled DOL-initiated EPA cases involving 283 
present and former nurse's aides for $257,000 in back wages). 
During the fiscal year ending September 20, 1979, the DOL recovered $10.3 million in 
settlements and awards in EPA cases. 102 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 290 (1979). The DOL 
statistics do not include amounts recovered in private EPA actions. 
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wage discrimination. These anti-job-segregation statutes protect 
workers' rights to integrate traditionally single-sex jobs. Since 
wage discrimination cannot survive the end of job separation, 
the integration of the workforce means the end of such wage dis-
crimination as may exist. The force of Title VII is augmented by 
Executive Order No. 11,246 and its amendments248 and its many 
state and municipal analogs, together with associated regula-
tions and guidelines. 249 These laws place the weight of federal 
and state regulatory authority behind job integration; they use 
the power to withhold government contracts to impel employers 
to action; and they require employers to take the initiative to 
integrate their workforces. As with many governmental regula-
tory activities (or for that matter, private regulatory activities), 
the enforcement of Executive Order No. 11,246 has been uneven 
in vigor and effectiveness. But recent events make it clear that 
Executive Order No. 11,246 is no paper tiger. 250 The goals of gov-
ernmental regulation are more likely to be achieved by improv-
ing the internal efficiency of the enforcement agencies than by 
generating entirely new responsibilities, together with the corre-
sponding multiplication of rules, regulations, guidelines, and 
procedures, 251 for the agencies and courts. 
'" Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 1964-1965 Comp. 339 (1967), reprinted in 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e app., at 1232 (1976), as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 
1966-1970 Comp. 684 (1971) and Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 1966-1970 Comp. 803 
(1971). 
'" See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §§ 1600.735-1643.707 (1979) (EEOC rules and regulations), 8 
CAL. ADMIN. CoDE §§ 295-296.4 (rules and regulations of California Fair Employment 
Practices Commission) (1979). 
,.. For example, on June 28, 1979, Uniroyal, Inc., was debarred by the OFCCP and 
declared ineligible to receive government contracts or subcontracts. 3 EQUAL EMPLOYER 
(FED.) ,r 270 (July 16, 1979). Uniroyal is the largest firm to date to be debarred because of 
discrimination under Exec. Order No. 11,246. At the time it was cut off from new govern-
ment business, Uniroyal had more than $36 million in federal government contracts. Uni-
royal subsequently agreed to settle its debarment case by paying $5.2 million to 750 fe-
male current and former employees and restoring their pension and seniority status. This 
backpay award is the largest settlement in such a case since 1973, when American Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co. agreed to pay $52 million. Under the terms of the Uniroyal settle-
ment, the OFCCP agreed to reinstate Uniroyal as an eligible government contractor. 3 
EQUAL EMPLOYER (FED.) ,r 445 (Nov. 5, 1979); 102 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 178 (1979). Uni-
royal was the eighth government contractor to be debarred during the past two years for 
violating the requirements of Exec. Order No. 11,246. In April 1979, the Labor Depart-
ment debarred Loffland Brothers Co., one of the world's largest oil drilling companies, for 
failing to maintain an affirmative action plan pursuant to its responsibilities as a govern-
ment contractor under Exec. Order No. 11,246. 3 EQUAL EMPLOYER (FED.) ,r 178 (May 7, 
1979) . 
.., The feminist economist Francine Blau has made recommendations for more effec-
tive enforcement of sex discrimination law. F. BLAU, EQUAL PAY IN THE OFFICE 108-11 
(1977). Her recommendations, based on a very detailed statistical analysis, are for de-
ployment of enforcement resources in the "traditional" areas of hiring and promotion. Id. 
at 103-04. Blau's analyses show that it is in hiring and promotion, and not in equal pay, 
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In response to these considerations, supporters of the compara-
ble worth idea say that the law as it is does not work: they claim 
that jobs remain largely segregated and that the wages of women 
and minorities are not rising. 252 The first part of this response is a 
non sequitur, for sex segregation in the workplace is already a 
prime focus of Title VII, and no new force against sex segrega-
tion would be created by implementation of the comparable 
worth idea. Indeed, comparable worth would tend to inhibit the 
movement of women into non-traditional jobs.253 
The argument that the relative wages of minorities and women 
are not increasing is mistaken. Wages of blacks relative to those 
of whites have risen in recent years, and the relative wages of 
black women have risen more than those of any other group in 
American society for whom figures are available. 254 For women 
generally, both black and white, the proportion of women intra-
ditionally male jobs increased greatly in the 1970's.255 Although 
that the major problem resides. Id. at 24, 103-04. Like most economists, Blau does not 
even discuss wage discrimination in the sense that Professor Blumrosen uses the term. 
Blau points out that inefficient patterns of enforcement have serious consequences: 
[T)he current structure appears to militate against uniform and timely enforce-
ment of the law. Under the present system, it is possible that some employers 
will be deluged by investigators from different agencies, subjected to conflicting 
compliance requirements, and forced to defend themselves against the same dis-
crimination charge in a seemingly endless number of forums. Other employers 
(one suspects the majority) may not be subjected to any serious pressure to con-
form to the antidiscrimination statutes and regulations. At the same time, vic-
tims of discrimination languish as their complaints remain unprocessed. 
Id. at 107. 
•n Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 402-415. See address by EEOC Commissioner 
J. Clay Smith, supra note 9, at E-2. 
253 See part m supra. 
"" Between 1960 and 1970, 
[b]lack female hourly earnings, adjusted for age and schooling, rose 82 percent 
compared with 68 percent for black males and 53 percent for white females. By 
1969, hourly earnings of black females were only 15 percent less than those of 
white females of comparable age and schooling, while for women with more than 
twelve years of schooling the adjusted color differential had practically 
disappeared. 
Fuchs, Women's Earnings: Recent Trends and Long-Run Prospects, MONTHLY LAe. REv., 
May 1974, at 23 . 
... For example, between 1970 and 1978, the proportion of accountants who are women 
rose from 25.3% to 30.1%, a 19% increase; for engineers the corresponding increase was 
75%; for lawyers and judges, 100%; physicians and osteopaths, 27%; and nonfarm mana-
gerial-administrative officials, 41%. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WoMEN IN THE LA-
BOR FoRcE: SOME NEW DATA, SERIES 3 at Table 4 (Report No. 575, 1979). One indirect but 
impressive index of women's rising status in business is the recent increase in airline 
business travel by women. In 1979, business travel by women accounted for 17% of all 
U.S. airline revenue from business travel, an increase from 13% in 1977 and from only 1% 
in 1974. Women Travelers Find Safety and Harassment Can be Major Problems, Wall St. 
J., March 5, 1980, at 1, col. 1. The progress shown in these figures contrasts with the 
stasis conveyed by the statistics cited in Wage Discrimination because that article is 
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the overall ratio of fem ale to male earnings has remained almost 
constant, in recent years that ratio has been maintained in the 
face of a very large influx of women entering the labor force for 
the first time. After adjustments for the temporarily large pro-
portion of new women workers, the relative wages of women have 
risen.258 
Thus, changes are occurring in the status and the wages of 
women and minorities. No doubt Title VII and the EPA have 
contributed to those changes. But such changes are of a magp.i-
tude much greater than can be attributed to the law alone. If the 
fundamental arrangements within human society - arrange-
ments such as the institution of the family itself and the division 
of labor within the family - are of glacial solidity, it is apparent 
that late in the twentieth century the United States is experienc-
ing an increasingly rapid thaw of the glacier. With or without 
comparable worth theory, the rationalizations for discrimination 
against women in the workplace are moribund. Implementation 
of Professor Blumrosen's drastic remedies would do little to 
hasten those epochal changes in our society. Rather, the result 
would be enormous inflationary stresses on the economy, with 
attendant real losses for the majority of women as well as men.257 
CONCLUSION 
This article has demonstrated that wage differences between 
different jobs performed by men and women are not subject to 
the remedial framework of Title VII. The argument that a Title 
VII remedy should be judicially mandated because wage discrim-
ination is an inevitable consequence of the sexual or racial iden-
tification of particular occupations should be rejected for two 
principal reasons. First, no evidence exists that residual wage 
differentials resulting from discrimination can be detected or 
quantified by any present social science technique. Second, no 
basis exists under equal employment opportunity statutes or 
case law for such a remedy. 
This article has asserted that not only the courts but also Con-
gress should refrain from fashioning a "comparable worth" ap-
proach to wage differentials. The adoption of a comparable 
almost entirely based on older statistics. The changes in the period 1970-1978 generally 
were greater than in the entire period 1950-1970. Id . 
... For example, in the 1960's the female-male earnings ration for whites, adjusted for 
hours, age, and schooling, increased by 4.8%. Fuchs, supra note 254, at 23. See Economic 
Report of the President, 1974, quoted in MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 1974, at 22. 
257 See part III supra. 
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worth theory would result in inequitable enforcement, impose 
crushing economic burdens upon employers and the economy as 
a whole, reduce the real incomes of more women than it would 
benefit, and impede the attainment of the ultimate goals of 
equal employment opportunity. 
